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The European car market is characterized by extensive multimarket contact (i.e., the firms are 
present in many geographic and product markets), a high degree of interfirm linkages, and 
presence of several global automotive manufacturer groups. The impact of these factors on 
the firm behaviour has not been considered in the previous studies, which could explain more 
precisely the firm conduct in the European car market and shed more light on the pricing 
behaviour differences across markets, thus, possibly contributing to understanding better the 
price dispersion pattern in the European car market. Multiple market presence is generally 
argued to foster collusive firm behaviour. The major objective of this paper has therefore been 
to test the game-theoretic predictions about the impact of multimarket contact on the firm 
behaviour by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) for the European car market.  
The results of the study reveal the existence of the effect of multimarket contact on the firm 
behaviour in the European car market. The impact of multimarket contact on the firm 
behaviour is economically (quantitatively), however, rather insignificant. The impact of 
concentration on prices is found to be more considerable. For the mutual forbearance to hold, 
it may be, however, not just enough to be present in several markets. It could be important for 
firms to have “spheres of influence” in those markets. The effect of the multimarket on the 
firm behaviour is stronger in the more concentrated market. Concentration alone also 
contributes to higher prices. The strategic effects of the multimarket contact could be 
observed in the European car market, i.e., the redistribution of the market power from the 
more collusive to the more competitive markets. The result is that multimarket contact may 
lead to lower prices in the more concentrated markets.  
To sum up, the results of the study reveal some weak quantitative effect of multimarket 
contact on pricing/market conduct in the European car market as well as provide some 
evidence on designing strategic policies by the automotive firms and shifting their market 
















 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der europäische Automobilmarkt ist charakterisiert durch den hohen Grad an Multi-Markt-
Kontakt (d.h. die Unternehmen begegnen sich in vielen geographischen und Produkt-
Märkten), den hohen Grad an zwischenbetrieblicher Verflechtung (‚linkages’) und die 
Präsenz globaler Automobilherstellergruppen. Die Auswirkung dieser Faktoren auf das 
Verhalten der Unternehmen wurde in früheren Studien nicht untersucht. Sie könnte jedoch 
dabei helfen, das Unternehmensverhalten auf dem europäischen Automobilmarkt präziser zu 
erklären und die Preisverhaltensdifferenzen auf den Märkten zu erläutern, und dadurch 
möglicherweise zu einem besseren Verständnis der beobachteten Preisunterschiede auf dem 
europäischen Automobilmarkt beizutragen.  
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen die Existenz eines Effektes des Multi-Markt-Kontakts 
auf das Unternehmensverhalten auf dem europäischen Automobilmarkt. Dieser Effekt ist aber 
wirtschaftlich (quantitativ) nicht signifikant. Der Effekt der Konzentration auf die Preise ist 
höher. Um die ‚mutual forbearance’ Hypothese zu unterstützen, ist es nicht ausreichend nur 
auf verschiedenen Märkten präsent zu sein. Es könnte wichtig sein, Einflussbereiche auf 
diesen Märkten zu haben. Der Effekt des Multi-Markt-Kontakts auf das 
Unternehmensverhalten ist stärker auf den höher konzentrierten Märkten. Die Konzentration 
allein trägt auch zu höheren Preisen bei. Die strategischen Effekte des Multi-Markt-Kontakts 
können auf dem europäischen Automobilmarkt beobachtet werden: Die Neuverteilung der 
Marktmacht von den mehr kollusiven zu den wettbewerblicheren Märkten. Das Ergebnis ist, 
dass der Multi-Markt-Kontakt zu niedrigeren Preisen auf den mehr konzentrierten Märkten 
führen könnte.  
Zusammenfassend zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie einen schwachen quantitativen Effekt 
des Multi-Markt-Kontakts auf das Preisverhalten und das „market conduct“ Verhalten auf 
dem europäischen Automobilmarkt. Sie liefert auch einige Evidenzen zum Design der 
strategischen Politik bei den Automobilherstellern und zur Verschiebung der Marktmacht 
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Abstract: This paper aims to study geographical and multi-product linkages of markets 
(multiple market presence) and firm behaviour interdependence as a result of such linkages 
existence. In particular, it attempts to answer whether the multimarket linkages lead to more 
cooperative behaviour among the firms, which results in higher prices and profits, and 
whether the degree of collusive/cooperative behaviour varies across markets. These issues are 
investigated within a structural oligopoly model for differentiated products for the European 
automobile market on the basis of the aggregate product-level data for 1970-1999. The results 
of the study reveal weak (quantitative) effect of multimarket contact on market 
conduct/pricing in the European car market as well as provide some evidence on the 
redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets 
due to multimarket contact. 
Keywords: multimarket contact, collusion, automobile industry, test for non-nested 
hypothesis, menu test, structural oligopoly models, conjectural variations 
JEL-Classification: L13, L25, L62 
* Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Department of Industrial Economics and 
International Management, P.O. Box 10 34 43, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany, phone: +49-








                                                 
1    I am thankful for the financial support to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)) and the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) during my PhD 
studies at the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE), University of Mannheim. I am very 
grateful for the comments to Konrad Stahl and for the discussion to Frank Verboven at the early stage of 
the paper. Enormous thanks to my sister Tetyana Romanchenko for data assistance. The comments of the 
participants of 2007 CDSE Doctoral Seminar, 2007 9th INFER annual conference, 2008 Spring Meeting 
of Young Economists, 2008 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2008 EEA-
ESEM conference and 2008 EARIE conference are appreciated.   1
1. Introduction    
Most of the existing on the European car market
2 studies has been devoted to the investigation 
of significant price dispersion in the European car market (e.g., Verboven, 1996, Degryse and 
Verboven, 2000, Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)
3. Empirical studies find the following 
reasons for the price dispersion in the European car market: differences in demand elasticities, 
concentration, import quota constraints, lack of uniform taxation, incomplete pass-through of 
exchange rates, differences in local costs
4, etc. Verboven (1996) mentions considerable cross-
border arbitrage costs, which result in geographical car market fragmentation
5. The volume of 
parallel imports is very low. Ginsburgh (1996) and Lutz (2000) point out the “block 
exemption” to be the most important factor that has hindered competition in the European car 
market. Additional obstacles to purchase a car abroad are national type approval rules 
(harmonized only in 1995) and national registration systems (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001). 
This leads to significant artificial trade barriers. 
The European car market is characterized by extensive multimarket contact (i.e., the firms 
are present in many geographic and product markets), a high degree of interfirm linkages, and 
presence of several global automotive manufacturer groups
6. The impact of these factors on 
the firm behaviour has not been considered in the previous studies, which could explain more 
precisely the firm conduct in the European car market and shed more light on the pricing 
behaviour differences across markets, thus, possibly contributing to understanding better the 
price dispersion pattern in the European car market. 
Multiple market presence is generally argued to foster collusive firm behaviour (e.g., 
Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, Spagnolo, 1999). The major objective of this paper has been 
to test the game-theoretic predictions about the impact of multimarket contact on the firm 
behaviour by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) for the European car market. First of all, I have 
aimed to test for the general effect of the multimarket contact presence, i.e., the extent of the 
markets overlap, on the firms’ equilibrium behaviour pattern. Furthermore, the firms should 
“forbear” from retaliating more, the larger shares they have in those markets. For them there 
is more to lose in the concentrated markets if they choose to deviate from collusive prices, 
and there will be lower coordination costs in those markets. That is why, I have attempted to 
investigate whether the multimarket contact effect on collusion is stronger in the more 
concentrated markets. In empirical studies it is usually difficult to measure the effect of 
multimarket contact on competition and to differentiate between the impact of multimarket 
contact and concentration on pricing, which I have intended to address in this paper. I have 
also aimed to test directly for the presence of the “spheres of influence” that would foster 
collusive behaviour (this term has been introduced by Edwards (1955) and has been discussed 
                                                 
2    In Introduction I refer to European car market as a whole Western European car market. In my 
estimations later, however, under the European car market the new car sales in the following five 
countries are meant: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
3   A detailed survey and major findings of these studies can be in particular found in Degryse and Verboven 
(2000). A number of studies on the price differentials in the European car market have been published by 
the European Commission. Questions being addressed in the other European car market studies have been 
in particular the effects of the reform of the car distribution system in Europe (Brenkers and Verboven, 
2006a), and defining a relevant car market (e.g., Brenkers and Verboven, 2006b). 
4    Manufacturing cost differences across countries in the European car market have been found to be 
important (e.g., Kirman and Schueller, 1990). The highest-cost producer is the UK, followed by Italy and 
Germany, with Belgium and France being the least-cost producers. 
5   The possibility of arbitrage trade between markets and the degree of market segmentation have been 
addressed in Lutz (2004). 
6   At present there are about 13 global independent automotive manufacturer groups. These manufacturer 
groups own several car brands (e.g., VW Group). The notion of interfirm linkages comprises equity and 
contractual as well as horizontal and vertical relationships among the firms. This issue will be discussed 
in more detail later in the paper.   2
by Bernheim and Whinston (1990)). That is, I have tested for collusion among “influential 
rivals”, which could respect each others’ “spheres of influence” (e.g., these could be the 
markets where they have cost advantages). Finally, I have intended to test for the presence of 
the strategic effects of the multimarket contact as specified by Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990), namely, the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more 
competitive markets in case of differentiated products due to the multimarket contact in the 
European car market. 
The previous empirical evidence on multimarket contact effects has been rather 
inconclusive concerning the existence, sign and significance of the effect on the tacit 
collusion (e.g., Heggestand and Rhoades, 1978, Scott, 1982, Evans and Kessides, 1994, 
Parker and Röller, 1997). In Leheyda (2007a) I could find some evidence about the possible 
existence of the multimarket contact effects on the firm behaviour in the US light vehicles 
market. However, some additional evidence could have been worthwhile to get to argue 
firmly about the relevance of these effects for the automobile markets. In particular, it was 
difficult to differentiate that effect from the possible concentration effect on collusive pricing. 
As compared to that study, in this paper the longer period of time and a greater number of 
markets allow me to study a richer number of the research objectives (including the existence 
of the strategic effects of the multimarket contact) and apply other approaches to study the 
multimarket contact (as well as concentration) effects on the firm behaviour. Geographical 
aspect of the multimarket contact is added to the multi-product context of the automotive 
industry, which increases the number of markets, across which the automotive firms interact. 
Evidence for collusive behaviour found in the other studies, or facts observed in reality
7 
could serve as an additional motivation to investigate the multimarket contact hypothesis. The 
empirical evidence on the multimarket contact effects existence, if found, might be another 
potential explanation/motive for cooperative/collusive behaviour among the firms. Verboven 
(1996) could not reject the hypothesis of the presence of collusive behaviour in Germany and 
United Kingdom in 1990. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) attribute the higher prices in Italy to 
the presence of the strong bias towards domestic brands, higher prices in the UK to “the better 
equipped cars and/or differences in the dealer discount practices”. Brenkers and Verboven 
(2006a) find that the firm behaviour in the UK is slightly more collusive than the Bertrand-
type behaviour, and that the behaviour in France, Germany and Italy is slightly less 
competitive than the multiproduct behaviour as compared to Belgium. As compared to the 
above three studies
8, I am using other approaches to identify the collusive firm behaviour
9. In 
addition, I try to link it to the presence of the extensive multimarket contact and high 
concentration in the European car market. That is, I attempt not only to report the existence of 
the collusive behaviour in the European car market, but point out some factors behind its 
existence if found. Jaumandreu and Moral (2006) find support for the price coalition by 
domestic and European firms in the Spanish car market during 1990-1996, notwithstanding 
the increased competition starting 1993 (connected with tariffs dismantling for foreign firms, 
demand downturn, and high entry of new models). 
                                                 
7   The UK has been, e.g., mentioned as the only European country where a legal investigation for collusive 
behaviour has been initiated by Monopolies and Merger Commission (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001). 
8   These are the only studies that estimate structural oligopoly models with product differentiation for the 
total European car market. The other studies apply mostly the reduced-form approach to study the price 
dispersion in the European car market, or they concentrate on specific country markets developments. 
9    For the demand side, I take the similar demand specification. I am not interested in the demand 
specification as such in this paper. The most important for me has been to get the reliable estimates of 
price and correlation parameters that could have been used to estimate substitution patterns, markups and 
market conduct parameters.   3
Absence of the consistent and considerable evidence and no targeted study on the firm 
behaviour in the European car market has served as an additional motivation for doing this 
study. For example, Verboven (1996) argues that there could be differences in the degree of 
collusive behaviour across countries and calls for a more detailed analysis of the differences 
in the firm behaviour across the countries. My study has been meant to be a contribution to 
the market conduct literature using new empirical approaches in the IO. In this paper the 
emphasis is on different demand and cost conditions in geographical markets and also product 
markets, which could lead to different degrees of collusion/cooperative behaviour in these 
markets due to multimarket contact, which has been pointed out by Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990). The idea of this paper is to extend the empirical approach of structural oligopoly 
model with product differentiation by Verboven (1996), Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and 
Brenkers and Verboven (2006a, b) for geographical markets to study the impact of the degree 
of geographical and multiproduct market linkages on the firm behaviour in the European car 
market. To sum up, this study attempts to systematize the previous evidence on the firm 
behaviour in the European car market and draw some new inferences by going further into the 
methodology on the firm equilibrium interactions. 
The major contribution of this paper in terms of the methodology to study the impact of 
multiple market presence on the firm behaviour is to estimate conjectural variation parameters 
(in case of differentiated products) and test the impact of concentration and multimarket 
contact within this market conduct equation. These effects are tested directly within the 
hedonic pricing equation as well. To measure the degree of multimarket linkages, I construct 
several multimarket contact measures at the firm and market level. I also discuss different 
“spheres of influence” for the car producers at geographic, market segment and geographic-
product market levels. In addition, the likelihood of a number of multimarket contact firms 
coalitions as candidates for a potential equilibrium outcome in the European car market is 
being tested on the basis of the menu approach. In particular, the test for non-nested 
hypotheses by MacKinnon, White, and Davidson (1983) and the model selection test by 
Rivers and Vuong (2002) are applied to test for different modes of market conduct. 
The results of the study reveal the existence of the effect of multimarket contact on the firm 
behaviour in the European car market as well as provide some evidence on the redistribution 
of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. The impact of 
multimarket contact on the firm behaviour is economically (quantitatively), however, rather 
insignificant. The impact of concentration on prices is found to be more considerable. The 
multimarket contact effect on the market conduct and prices may be also stronger in the more 
concentrated markets. It has been challenging to choose the best model specification for the 
supply side on the basis of the menu approach that has been aimed to test directly for the 
“spheres of influence” version of the mutual forbearance hypothesis. 
The paper proceeds in the following way. First, the literature review is presented. In the 
next section I describe the structural characteristics of the European car market as well as 
observed in the market multimarket contact and inter-firm linkages. After that empirical 
framework for testing the mutual forbearance hypothesis is discussed. Then data, estimation 
procedure and results are described. The paper ends with some conclusions. 
2. Literature review   
The literature on multimarket contact theory has been more extensively discussed in the paper 
on the multimarket contact effects in the US light vehicles market (Leheyda, 2007a). In this 
section I would like to highlight some empirical studies that are more relevant for this study 
and have not been discussed in detail in the paper earlier.   4
As I have already mentioned, the existing empirical studies (e.g., Heggestand and Rhoades, 
1978, Scott, 1982, Evans and Kessides, 1994, Parker and Röller, 1997), which are mostly 
done for airlines and banking industry, have failed to give conclusive evidence about the 
existence, sign and significance of the multimarket contact effect on facilitating and 
maintaining collusion. These are mainly the cross-sectional studies. They may rather identify 
correlations between multimarket contact and competition, while prices, concentration and 
multimarket contact are rather endogenously determined. One of the sources of endogeneity is 
the unobserved heterogeneity across markets, which can be captured by introducing market 
fixed effects in panel-data models. 
Most existing empirical studies concentrate on testing the multimarket contact effect, based 
on the construction of some multimarket contact measure, on the firm’s performance (i.e., the 
so-called reduced-form approach), while there have been virtually no studies done about the 
multimarket contact effect on collusion within a structural model of firm behaviour. The only 
exceptions are the papers by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) and Parker and Röller (1997) for 
homogenous products. The existing empirical studies have a major problem to distinguish 
between internal (e.g., concentration, demand conditions, barriers to entry) and external 
effects (e.g., multimarket contact) upon the firm performance (Bernheim and Whinston, 
1990). 
Most of the existing empirical studies on the multimarket contact effects focus on 
geographical markets (for banking, airlines, mobile telephony markets, etc.). The only 
exception there seems to be a paper by Scott (1982), where the study is done for the lines of 
businesses. 
Some studies find that the effect of multimarket contact on prices is stronger in the more 
concentrated markets (e.g., Scott (1982), Jans and Rosenbaum (1996)). Scott (1982) and Jans 
and Rosenbaum (1996) find a more pronounced effect of multimarket contact on collusion in 
the more concentrated markets, and higher impact of concentration on collusion in the 
markets characterized by the more extensive multimarket contact. Fernandez and Marin 
(1998) find lower prices in the markets where it is easier to collude, and higher prices in the 
markets where it is more difficult to reach collusive agreements. They attribute this effect to 
the presence of the so-called strategic effects of the multimarket contact, i.e., the 
redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. 
The focus of many empirical studies are the general conditions of the existence of the 
multimarket contact effects (i.e., studying the impact of the overlap of the markets in which 
the firms are present), while not so many studies focus explicitly on the different effectiveness 
of multimarket contact when the firms differ in their territorial interests (in other words, 
“spheres of influence”). This idea of the “spheres of influence” version of the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis has been discussed in detail by Gimeno (1999). He argues that firms 
under multimarket contact competition tend to recognize different “territorial interests” that 
the firms may have in different markets. They may use their market shares in the markets that 
are important for their rivals to reduce the competition in those markets that are important for 
them and sustain their dominant positions. The benefit for the firms from multimarket 
retaliation threats is not equal across all their markets. These threats of multimarket retaliation 
are rather used by the firm to defend its position in those markets, where the firm has “spheres 
of influence”. The empirical literature on this aspect of the multimarket competition is not 
extensive, which may serve as an additional argument to investigate this issue more 
profoundly in this study. 
In addition to the construction of multimarket contact measures and testing their impact on 
the firm performance, the estimation of the so-called conjectures has been another approach 
used in the literature to study the firm strategic interdependence as a result of multiple market   5
presence. Feinberg (1985) argues that the theory of the mutual forbearance could be treated as 
an extension of traditional oligopoly theory, which foresees the possible existence of cross-
market conjectural variations. When firms meet each other in several markets, a firm can 
conjecture a possible reaction of another firm in all the markets where they meet each other to 
an action by anyone of them. The estimation of own- and cross-market effects is in tradition 
of the empirical industries with market power (survey by Bresnahan (1989)). Feinberg (1985) 
and Gelfand and Spiller (1987) estimate “conjectures”, i.e., own- and cross-market reactions, 
and interpret them in terms of the mutual forbearance hypothesis
10. But what is actually rather 
being tested in these papers, that is the notion of strategic interdependence (introduced by 
Areeda and Turner, 1979), or the presence of multiproduct oligopolistic strategies, which may 
be not actually the evidence for the cooperative behaviour of firms. When firms recognize this 
mutual interdependence, the mutual forbearance behaviour can evolve, which led to the 
hypothesis formulated by Edwards (1955) and formalized by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) 
(i.e., collusive behaviour as strong interdependence across markets). 
The number of studies that estimate the conjectural variation parameters for differentiated 
products industries is rather limited (as compared, e.g., to those that estimate homogenous 
goods demand and marginal cost). Thus, any contribution in this field could be welcome, 
despite some criticisms of this approach (e.g., identification problem, conjectures 
interpretation). Both menu
11 and conjectural variation approaches to identify the market 
conduct have their weaknesses, so it is worthwhile to apply both of them in order to come up 
with the reliable results at the end. This has been the strategy pursued in this paper. 
3. European car market 
3.1. Structural characteristics 
The European car market, although less concentrated than the US car market, is characterized 
by significant cross-country differences in concentration ratios. The markets are especially 
concentrated in France and Italy, followed by Germany and the UK, with the lowest 
concentration ratio for Belgium (see Graph B1, Appendix B). The most concentrated market 
based on the one-firm (C1)-concentration ratio is Italy, while the most concentrated market on 
the basis of the four-firm (C4)- and seven-firm (C7)-concentration ratios is France in 1999. 
During the considered period of time, i.e., during 1970-1999, the concentration ratios have 
declined in Italy. The concentration ratios for the total European car market have stayed on 
average at the same level, while the multimarket contact, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, has increased. 
The number of producers in geographic markets has increased in 1999 as compared to 
1970. In particular, several foreign producers have entered the European car market (e.g., 
Mazda (1972), Mitsubishi (1976), Daihatsu (1979), Hyundai (1980), Suzuki (1981), Seat 
(1983), Skoda (1993)). The share of the non-European firms is the highest in Belgium, where 
there are no domestic producers. 
The European car market is also characterized by different tax levels (see Table B2, 
Appendix B) and import quotas (3.0% in France, 15.0% in Germany, 1.0% in Italy, and 
11.0% in the UK (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)). 
The above mentioned differences in concentration ratios as well as in the number of car 
producers across geographic-product markets imply that the markets that I consider could be 
                                                 
10   Their analysis is based upon the investigation of the "conjectures" values and their change as a result of 
some regulatory actions. 
11   The menu approach to identifying the firm behaviour has been in particular described by Gasmi et al. 
(1990).   6
quite different. As Bernheim and Whinston (1990) state (among other possible conditions), 
the effect of the multimarket contact on cooperative behaviour can be facilitated in case of 
different markets, or in case of a different number of firms in those markets. 
A few words should be mentioned about the international price dispersion in the European 
car market. International price differences are the lowest for the luxury car market segments, 
while the highest international price differentials are observed in segments C and D (Degryse 
and Verboven, 2000). In general in the smaller car market segments the price differentials are 
found to be higher. The highest price differentials are observed by Japanese and Italian brands 
(that have most models in the smaller car market segments). As for international price 
differentials across brands, Degryse and Verboven (2000) find the highest price differentials 
by Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Nissan, Honda, Toyota, Subaru, Mazda and Ford, and the lowest by 
Mercedes, BMW, Lancia, Peugeot, Citroen and Renault. Lutz (2000) finds that among 
European car producers Peugeot/Citroen, Fiat and Ford Groups price-discriminate more than 
GM Opel, VW, and Renault. The lowest absolute price differentials have been found for 
BMW, Mercedes, Audi and Volvo. Japanese producers are not found to price-discriminate 
more than other producers but Nissan, Daihatsu, Suzuki and Subaru price-discriminate more 
than Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi and Mazda. At the country level the most expensive models 
are found in the UK, followed by Germany, France, Austria, Finland and Greece. 
3.2. Multimarket and multi-firm linkages 
This sub-section is built in the following way. I start with a definition of a geographic-product 
market in the European car market, while the exact definition of a market is important for 
identifying the effect of the multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. After that I present a 
general picture of multimarket contact across markets, namely describe the overlap of the 
markets, in which the automobile companies are present, and describe the “territorial 
interests”, the presence of which could make the automotive companies respect each other’s 
“spheres of influence” and, thus, behave cooperatively. This discussion is presented at the 
geographic, market segment, and geographic-product market for the European car market. 
Next the descriptive statistics for the constructed multimarket contact measures and 
concentration ratios is presented. The sub-section ends with some discussion of interfirm 
relationships between the automobile companies. 
3.2.1. Definition of a geographic-product market 
The European car market is characterized by considerable multimarket contact both within 
geographic and product-level dimensions. Geographic-product market, i.e., the overlap of 
geographic and product markets (e.g., Belgium subcompact, Germany luxury, etc.), is a main 
unit upon which the multimarket contact effects are investigated in this paper. 
Geographic-product market is used as a market to define the number of multiple contacts 
among the firms and to construct the multimarket contact and concentration measures. The 
major question is how distinct these markets are so that one could discuss them separately and 
investigate the multimarket contact effects. The major criteria used in the literature to 
delineate the market boundaries
12 is to consider the cross-price elasticities of demand 
(econometric tests for the delineation of market boundaries have been developed by Sheffman 
                                                 
12   Candidates for markets are different products or services within an industry, geographical demand for a 
product or service, different industries (Gimeno and Woo, 1999). Market definition is partially 
determined by the level of aggregation as there could be multiple products in any industry, or a country 
market can be divided into regional, or local markets.   7
and Spiller (1996)), or to investigate the co-movements in prices across markets
13 (e.g., Kay, 
1990). 
Brenkers and Verboven (2006b)
14 find the existence of distinct product markets in the 
European car market: the segments are the relevant markets for all classes (subcompact, 
compact, intermediate, standard/luxury, and sports), except for minivan, for which the 
relevant market definition should be the aggregate country level, i.e., all new cars. They 
recommend the competition authorities to investigate the impact of their policies for each car 
market segment separately. The cross-price elasticities of demand are usually found to be low 
with respect to the cars in the other market segments (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, 
Brenkers and Verboven, 2006a). Demand linkages if any are likely to be stronger across 
adjacent than across more remote market segments. Different price dispersion across market 
segments is also observed in the European car market (e.g., Degryse and Verboven, 2000). To 
sum up, industry analysts and academic researchers support the view that the car market 
segments constitute distinct sub-markets, which differ in consumer demand, technology, and 
competitors’ type (e.g., Requena-Silvente and Walker, 2005). 
Geographical European car market fragmentation is taken as a standardized fact: there is 
very little, or no cross-price elasticity of demand across country markets. There is no single 
European car market: the European car market consists of many national markets with quite 
distinct characteristics. 
Automotive firms are multinational firms that are present in a lot of geographic-product 
markets. The mutual forbearance foresees that there is a company-level decision-making 
process coordinated across geographic-product markets
15. It has been argued that the 
European car market fragmentation prevents from exploiting the economies of scale (“plant-
scale”) (European Commission, 2004). 
At the product market level the economies of scale (“product-scale”, large numbers of more 
or less the same product) and scope (ability to make many different and new products; not one 
car for different markets, but different cars for different markets and types of customers; the 
number of market segments and niches has been continuously increasing) have been 
important for the automotive firms. The VW Group is an example of the company that relies a 
lot on scale and scope economies. 
3.2.2. General picture of multimarket contact across markets 
In addition to a just simple market overlap between multipoint competitors (i.e., presence of 
the same competitors in several markets), the “spheres of influence” of firms could play an 
even more important role in sustaining collusive outcomes between multimarket firms as the 
firms may tend to respect each other’s “spheres of influence” and behave less competitively. 
The “spheres of influence” of firms could be defined on the basis of the “market share 
dominance” and “market dependence”
16. “Market share dominance” is measured by the 
largest shares the firms hold in different markets. It is defined for every firm, that is why, the 
                                                 
13   If there is a high positive correlation between the prices of two potentially competing products, that 
would mean that the products are likely to be substitutes, and, thus, they could be in the same relevant 
market. 
14   Brenkers and Verboven (2006b) apply the SSNIP (a small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
prices) test to delineate relevant markets. 
15   Gimeno and Woo (1999) argue that the decisions should be coordinated at the organization level if the 
managers want to exploit the scope economies. 
16   This has been first suggested by Gimeno (1999). He actually uses three criteria to define asymmetric 
territorial interests of firms: market share dominance, market dependence, and resource centrality. Under 
"resource centrality" the firms have different territorial interests because of different competitive 
advantage, which is linked to "underlying resources and capabilities of the firm".   8
share of a firm may not be the largest one if it is not a large car producer, especially this can 
hold for premium producers, or foreign producers. “Market dependence” (“importance” of the 
market) is measured by the percentage of the firm’s total sales (revenue) represented by that 
market
17. Domestic car markets could be considered as “spheres of influence” of the 
automobile producers at the geographical level. In addition, there are “spheres of influence” 
for producers at the product level. 
Below I concentrate on the descriptive analysis of the multimarket presence of the 
automotive manufacturers at geographical, product and geographic-product market level as 
well as discuss the presence of the “spheres of influence” for the automotive manufacturers in 
the European car market. This is used later to define the possible coalitions of the multimarket 
contact firms. I start with the description of the multimarket presence of the automotive firms 
and their “spheres of influence” at the geographical level. 
Table B3 (Appendix B) gives an idea of the most important country markets for the car 
producers (comparison of 1999 to 1970). The simple market overlap can be inferred from this 
Table: many of the OEMs, especially large volume ones like VW, are present in almost all 
countries. In 1999 France is the most important country market for Peugeot and Renault. 
Germany is the most important country market for BMW, Daihatsu, Kia, Mazda, Mercedes, 
Mitsubishi, GM, Suzuki, Toyota, VW and Smart. Italy is the most important country market 
for Fiat, Hyundai and Daewoo. The UK is the most important country market for Ford, Honda 
and Nissan. As for the largest European volume car producers that could be seen as the 
primary candidates to recognize and respect each other’s “spheres of influence”, to sum up, it 
can be seen that Italy is the most important market for Fiat, Germany is the most important 
market for VW and GM, France is the most important market for Peugeot and Renault, and 
the UK is the most important market for Ford. The large players are likely to be uninterested 
in forming implicit collusive arrangements with small players like Daihatsu. Mercedes and 
BMW are premium producers that will rather compete with each other. Audi i s  a l s o  a  
premium brand, but it is considered as a part of the volume car producer VW Group. 
Table B4 (Appendix B) shows the share of a firm in the total country market sales in 1999 
as compared to 1970 and gives some picture of “market share dominance”. The “spheres of 
influence” defined on the basis of this criterion are France for Peugeot and Renault, Germany 
for BMW, Mercedes and VW, Italy for Fiat, the UK for GM and Ford, which actually reflect 
the “domestic origin” of a producer, except for the UK
18. The largest share in Belgium 
belongs to VW, in France - to Peugeot, in Germany - to VW, in Italy - to Fiat, in the UK - to 
Ford. The largest shares in the total European car market (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the UK) belong to VW (20.1%), Peugeot (13.1%) and GM (12.2%). 
Now I move to the discussion of the multimarket contact presence of the automotive 
producers and the determination of the “spheres of influence” at the market segment level for 
the European car market. 
Table B5 (Appendix B) gives the largest car manufacturers in each market segment and for 
the whole European car market in 1999 as compared to 1970 (“market share dominance”). In 
general, the structure of the European car market in 1999 is as follows: subcompact (37.8%), 
compact (30.2%), intermediate (19.7%), standard (6.7%) and luxury (5.6%). As for the simple 
overlap of markets, a fewer number of firms are present in almost all markets, which are 
                                                 
17   As compared to the "market share dominance" criterion, the "market dependence" criterion takes into 
account the size of the market and the size of the firm. For example, a large firm may have a dominant 
share in a small market, but this may be strategically unimportant for this large firm. 
18   As for the non-European firms, the so-called "spheres of influence" in 1999 are Belgium for Suzuki, 
FujiHI, Mitsubishi and Toyota, the UK for Honda, and Nissan, and Germany for Daihatsu, Kia, and 
Mazda. The shares of these firms in these countries are, however, very small.   9
defined here to be the market segments, as compared to the overlap of geographical markets. 
There are some firms like Mercedes and BMW that are present in one or two market 
segments, here standard and/or luxury market segments, or e.g., Kia is present only in the 
smaller car market segments. Subcompact market segment is a “sphere of influence” for 
Daihatsu, Fiat, Hyundai, Renault, Daewoo and Smart. Compact market segment is a “sphere 
of influence” for Ford, Mitsubishi, GM and VW. Intermediate market segment is a “sphere of 
influence” for Kia, Mazda, Nissan, Peugeot, Suzuki, Toyota and VW. Standard market 
segment is a “sphere of influence” for BMW and Honda. Luxury market segment is a “sphere 
of influence” for Mercedes. Except for Fiat, Renault, Peugeot, VW, GM, Ford, BMW, 
Mercedes, the other firms have small shares. The collusive arrangements of the influential 
players with small automotive players are highly unlikely. The most important markets 
(“market dependence”) are subcompact for Daihatsu, Fiat, Hyundai, Nissan, Peugeot, 
Renault, Suzuki, Toyota, Daewoo, and Smart, compact for Ford, Honda, Mazda, GM, and 
VW, intermediate for Kia and Mitsubishi, standard for BMW, and luxury for Mercedes. This 
can be inferred from Table B6 (Appendix B). 
The combination of geographic and product market presence leads to geographic-product 
market linkages, which is actually the level of my analysis. The below discussion is important 
to define the “spheres of influence” and “influential rivals” at the geographic-product market 
level, among whom later the assumption of collusive behaviour could be tested. Geographic-
product market linkages are described in Table B7 (Appendix B). The firms that are present in 
all 25 geographic-product markets in the European car market in 1999 (5 countries and 5 
market segments) are Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW. Peugeot and Renault are present in almost all 
market segments
19. BMW has also increased its presence across markets as compared to 
1970. For Fiat, Ford and Renault the three most important “spheres of influence” (based on 
“market share dominance”) are the respective domestic markets, while for GM and VW the 
“spheres of influence” may lie outside of the domestic country market. For Fiat these are 
subcompact, standard and luxury market segments in Italy. For Ford these are subcompact, 
compact and intermediate market segments in the UK. For Renault these are subcompact, 
compact and standard market segments in France. GM has the largest market shares in the 
subcompact market segment in Germany, and in the intermediate and standard market 
segments in the UK. As for VW, it has the largest market shares in the compact and 
intermediate market segments in Germany and in the intermediate market segment in Italy. 
Table B8 (Appendix B) presents the picture of the most important geographic-product 
markets for firms (“market dependence”). As for the largest car volume producers, the most 
important market for Fiat is Italy’s subcompact market segment, for Ford - the compact 
market in Germany, subcompact and compact markets in the UK, for GM - the compact 
market in Germany, for Peugeot - the subcompact market in France and intermediate market 
segment in France, for Renault - the subcompact market in France, for VW - the compact 
market segment in Germany. These firms might behave rather collusively if they would like 
that their competitors respect their “spheres of influence” in return for that they themselves 
respect the “spheres of influence” of their competitors. 
The biggest geographic-product markets in Europe are subcompact market segment in 
France (the most important for Peugeot and Renault), compact market segment in Germany 
(the most important market for GM and VW) and subcompact market segment in Italy (the 
most important for Fiat). For Ford the subcompact market segment in the UK is the most 
important. These firms could be interested in respecting each other’s “spheres of influence”, 
as the stakes in the markets are rather high.           
                                                 
19   As for non-European firms, Toyota and Nissan are the firms that are most frequently present in the 
geographic-product units of the European car market.   10
3.2.3. Multimarket contact and concentration measures for the European car 
market 
To measure the impact of multimarket contact on the firm behaviour in the European car 
market, I consider the construction of several multimarket contact measures. These measures 
can be constructed at the firm and market level. Quite a large number of geographic-product 
markets in which the automobile firms are present in the European car market allows me to 
construct these measures, which have not been considered for the automobile markets before 
(also a long period of time allows me to get variation in these measures (cross-sectional and 
within-group variation)). I consider four measures of the multimarket contact: number of 
geographic-product markets, in which a firm is present, number of multiple contacts of a 
particular firm with other firms, simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact 
measures
20. 
Two simple count measures of the multimarket contact presence have been constructed at 
the firm level: the number of geographic-product markets in which a firm is present and the 
number of multiple contacts (see Table C1, Appendix C). 
The number of geographic-product markets in which a firm is present is a simple count 
measure. Its interpretation can be twofold: multiple market presence (the larger the number of 
markets in which a firm is present, the greater is the probability that the firm will meet the 
same competitors in those markets, the more cooperatively the firm should then behave) and 
economies of scope (large producers are more likely to be present in several markets). 
The number of multiple contacts is constructed as the sum of pairwise contacts in a year: 
e.g., for Ford: the number of contacts between Ford and GM in all geographic-product 
markets where they are both present, plus the number of contacts between Ford and 
Mercedes, etc., i.e., the number of pairwise contacts in all contact markets for the particular 
firm with its competitors. The larger the number of these multiple contacts, the more 
cooperatively the firm should behave with its multiple competitors and the more collusively it 
will tend to set its prices (for the mutual forbearance hypothesis to hold). 
As compared to 1970, in 1999 the automotive firms are characterized by even greater 
multiple market presence and higher number of multiple contacts (in particular, due to the 
expansion of their product line, movement to new geographic and product markets, the entry 
of Asian competitors into the European car market). The average number of geographic-
product markets in which a firm is present increased from 14.02 in 1970 to 19.37 in 1999. The 
average number of multiple contacts for a firm went up from 93.49 in 1970 to 228.43 in 1999. 
The number of multiple contacts is also constantly being influenced by changes in the 
corporate ownership, which contributes to the variation in the multimarket contact measures. 
Simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact measures at geographic-product 
market level have been constructed (see Appendix A for details on the methodology of these 
measures construction, see Table C2, Appendix C for the descriptive statistics of these 
measures). 
The intuition behind the simple multimarket contact measure construction is as follows: to 
proxy the degree of multimarket contact in a particular geographic-product market 
1,..., kK = , I take every automotive manufacturer  1,..., nN =  in a market k  (which is defined 
to be a focal market, or market under consideration) and aggregate all the contacts this firm 
                                                 
20   These measures have been previously used in the literature, which may allow me to compare the results 
of this paper with the results of the other studies as well as derive some implications in terms of the use of 
such measures for the automobile industry. In Leheyda (2007a) these measures have not been constructed 
as there would have been little variation in these measures to identify their impact on prices due to a short 
period of time as well as a small number of markets has been observed.   11
has in K  markets (which are defined to be contact markets) with its  k N  competitors (i.e., the 
number of competitors in the market under consideration). The number of contacts is 
aggregated for all firms that are present in the market under consideration and then divided by 
the number of firm pairs in the focal market. Thus, the firm’s average multimarket contact 
with its rivals in the given market is calculated. As compared to the above considered number 
of multiple contacts with other firms calculated at the firm level, this measure is calculated as 
a market average for a pair of firms. 
In addition, the contact markets may have different importance for the firm, thus, the 
contacts need to be weighted taking into account different characteristics  of the contact 
markets. I weight each contact by the market shares of the firms. This reflects that the higher 
the market shares (and, thus, the firms’ stakes in those markets) are, the more likely the firms 
will try to compete less aggressively (to avoid punishments, which are likely to be more 
severely felt by the firm, when it has a large market share in that market), and the higher the 
profits the firms may expect to get. Then all the contacts are aggregated and divided by the 
number of firm pairs in the market under the consideration to get the average share-weighted 
multimarket contact measure at the market level. As compared to the simple multimarket 
contact measure, the share-weighted measure may show more variation (as there is large 
variation in the market shares over time). 
The higher the simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact measures for a 
market, the more cooperatively the firms should behave (for the mutual forbearance to hold) 
and the higher prices should be observed. 
The average simple multimarket contact measure increased from 8.07 in 1970 to 14.41 in 
1999, while the average market-share weighted multimarket contact measure somewhat 
decreased from 1258.53 in 1970 to 1021.11 in 1999. The highest simple count multimarket 
contact measure is found for the intermediate market segment, while the lowest value is found 
in the luxury market segment. In case of the share-weighted multimarket contact measure, the 
highest value is found for the luxury car market segment, which is related to the high market 
shares of luxury car producers and a small number of such producers in this market segment 
(BMW, Mercedes, and Fiat in Italy). 
Concentration measures (C1, C4, and C8) have been constructed at the country (see Graph 
B1) and geographic-product market level. Some descriptive statistics for these concentration 
measures at the geographic-product market level can be found in Table C3 (Appendix C). The 
average concentration ratios have decreased: C1 ratio from 47.38 in 1970 to 34.40 in 1999, 
C4 ratio from 89.68 to 77.15, C8 ratio from 99.53 to 94.45. On the basis of the C1 ratio, the 
most concentrated markets are the luxury car market segment of Belgium, France and 
Germany and the subcompact market segment of Italy. Except for the luxury car market 
segments, the most concentrated markets on the basis of C4 ratios are intermediate, standard 
and subcompact market segments in France, standard market segment in Germany, and 
standard and subcompact market segments in Italy. Higher concentration is generaly expected 
to result in higher prices. 
3.2.4. Some picture of interfirm linkages 
The discussion in this Section is important as I aim to test for the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis among the multimarket firms, and it should be decided whether these effects 
should be evaluated at brand (e.g., Mercedes), or manufacturer group (e.g., DaimlerChrysler) 
level. 
As it has been already mentioned, the automobile industry is characterized by a lot of 
interfirm linkages. By interfirm linkages I mean both contractual and equity arrangements of 
firms. By contractual arrangements first of all non-traditional contracts are implied (e.g., joint   12
R&D, joint product development, long-term sourcing agreements, joint manufacturing, joint 
marketing, shared distribution service). Equity agreements may generally take up different 
forms, in particular with or without new equity creation. The picture of international linkages 
between automotive manufacturers (in particular, contractual arrangements) can be found in 
Automobile Production (Automobil Produktion) (2005) that has been originally prepared by 
WardsAuto. 
The automobile industry has gone through a period of tremendous consolidation. This 
consolidation has influenced the degree of external multimarket contact and decreased the 
number of the independent automotive manufacturers. At present there are about 13 global 
independent automotive manufacturer groups. Table B9 (Appendix B) gives the picture of the 
presence of global manufacturer groups that own several car brands. These brands within a 
group may directly compete with each other especially if they are very similar and belong to 
the same market segment. For example, Opel and Saab are both present in the standard 
market segment. Or Rover and Volvo compete in the standard market segment, Ford and 
Rover both have car models in the compact market segment. 
Table B10 (Appendix B) gives the picture of the cross-ownership in the automobile 
industry
21. Cross-ownership arrangements between manufacturers and suppliers (i.e., vertical 
interfirm linkages) are not considered in this paper. As for the overlap of the market shares, 
for example, Ford and Mazda are present together in the three market segments: subcompact, 
compact and intermediate, Mazda has, however, much lower market segment shares than 
Ford. As for GM (Subaru, Suzuki, Isuzu) and Fiat constellation, Suzuki has very small market 
shares, Opel’s shares are higher than Fiat’s in the UK, Germany and Belgium, while Fiat’s 
shares are higher in Italy and somewhat more comparable in France. 
The multimarket contact effects in this paper are discussed at the level of automotive 
manufacturers, which may own several brands. The possible cross-ownerships are not taken 
into account. It could be worthwhile to find out about the interbrand competition within an 
automotive manufacturer group (e.g., VW Group). It is interesting to analyze whether groups 
(no brands) develop products to compete with rival firms, or they suffer more from 
“cannibalization”. The analysis could be more of relevance for only volume brands, or only 
premium brands. This could be a subject of future research. 
4. Structural oligopoly model for the European car market 
In this section of the paper an empirical oligopoly model for the European car market is 
presented. This is a model with multiproduct firms that sell differentiated products in 
geographically segmented markets. 
4.1. Demand side 
The demand equation is derived from a two-level nested logit where the price coefficient is 
interacted with income, and, thus, enters the demand equation in a non-linear way
22. 
The general utility function can be written down in the following way: 
                                                 
21   Partial ownership arrangements as it has been mentioned have been in particular discussed by Davis and 
Alley (2004) and Alley (1997). It has been found that even small partial ownership arrangements may 
lead to collusive behaviour. 
22   In the exposition below, I follow Berry (1994), Verboven (1996) and Brenkers and Verboven (2006a), 
after McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva and Lehrman (1985). The demand-side derivation on the basis of 
restricted two-level nested logit (i.e., without consumer heterogeneity) can be also found in Leheyda 
(2007b). The interaction of consumers' individual characteristics with products' characteristics is 
generally expected to allow getting more reasonable substitution patterns.   13
ij ij ij UVε =+                                                                                                                              (1) 
ij V  is the deterministic part of the utility function and can be expressed by 
ln( ) ij j i j Vy p δ α =+ − . The error term  ij ε  follows the assumptions of a two-level nested logit 
distribution. The common part to all consumers in the utility function is  jj j x δ βξ =+ . The 
individual-specific part is  ij i j p α ε −+ , where  1/ ii y α = .  i α  is the consumers’ distaste for 
price increases. It is assumed that the distribution of  i α  varies with income. Price sensitivity 
is modelled as inversely proportional to income. Income effects are one of the most important 
sources of consumer heterogeneity in the automobile markets. 
It is assumed that there are  1 G +  exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups,  0,..., gG = , 
where 0 is an outside good. In each group there are further subgroups  g H ,  1,..., g hH = . 
Utility  ij u  of household i for product  j  in subgroup h of group g  is given by: 
(1 ) (1 ) , , , ij j i j j ig g ihg hg ij g ux p j hg i j β αξ ε σ ε σ ε = − + + +− +− ∈ ⊂∀ ∀                                    (2) 
where (1 ) (1 ) ij ig g ihg hg ij ε εσ ε σ ε =+ − + −  and  1/ ii y α = . Variation in consumer tastes enters 
through  i α  and  ij ε . 
The error term  ij ε  is decomposed into an iid shock, a group-specific component and a sub-
group specific component.  ig ε ,  ih ε ,  ij ε  are standard for the nested logit distributions,  ig ε , 
(1 ) ig g ihg ε σε +−  and  (1 ) (1 ) ig g ihg hg ij ε σε σ ε +− +−  are assumed to have an extreme value 
distribution. It is assumed that  ij ε  are uncorrelated across customers; for a particular 
customer, ε ’s, which belong to the same group, will be more correlated with each other than 
with the ε’s that belong to any other group ( ig ε
23); and for a particular customer, ε ’s, which 
belong to the same subgroup, will be more correlated with each other than with the ε ’s that 
belong to any other subgroup ( ihg ε ). That is, the products of the same sub-group or group 
share common features, and consumers’ preferences for these features may be correlated. 
Nesting parameters  hg σ  and  g σ  can be interpreted as random coefficients on discrete 
dummies for subgroups and groups rather than on variables that are continuously measured 
(e.g., performance or size). It should be noted that correlation parameters  hg σ  and  g σ  here are 
allowed to be different across groups and subgroups. In such a way additional consumer 
heterogeneity is introduced into the model. 
hg σ  measures the degree of substitutability of products in a subgroup, and  g σ  is the degree 
of substitutability of products in a group. The following 01 gh g σ σ ≤ <<  should hold to be 
consistent with random utility maximization. That is, consumer preferences will be more 
correlated across all products of the same subgroup than across products of the same group 
but a different subgroup. Consequently, more plausible substitution patterns can be obtained, 
and localized competition among the products from the same group or subgroup can be 
allowed. 
                                                 
23   For consumer i , the variable ε  is common to all products in a group g  and has a distribution function 
that depends on  g σ . Similar interpretation is for a subgroup.   14
The above mentioned assumptions upon the aggregation of choices across all consumers 
result in the well-known formulas of the nested logit model for the conditional choice 
probabilities. The mean utility for the outside good is normalized to zero,  0 0 δ = . 
The choice probability of a consumer i for a car  j  in a subgroup h, group g  can be 
written down as: 
() / ( 1 ) / ( 1 )
/(1 ) /(1 ) ()
ji j h g i h g g i h g









−− =                                                                                         (3) 
where  ihg I ,  ig I  and  i I  are called “inclusive values” for consumer i, which are defined in the 
following way: 
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The individual probabilities over the number of individuals are averaged into the predicted 
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where  N  is the number of individuals drawn from an empirical income distribution. 
4.2. Cost side and multimarket contact equilibrium interactions 
The firm f maximizes its profits over all markets in period t  ft π : 
11
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where  M  is the number of markets,  fmt F  is the set of products of firm  f  in market m  in 
period t, 
w
jmt p  are wholesale prices for product  j  in market m  in period t,  mt p  are list prices 
(includes prices of products that are in market m in period t),  jmt c  is the constant marginal 
cost of producing product  j  in market m  in period t,  fmt e  is an exchange rate between the 
registration country of firm  f  and the destination market,  fst e  is an exchange rate between 
the registration country of firm  f  and the production location of model  j ,  mt L  is market size 
in market m  in period t, and  jmt s  is the share of product  j  in market m  in period t. 
jmt ϕ  is the weight on competitors’ products for product  j  in market m  in period t: a positive 
value means cooperative behaviour relative to Bertrand, while a negative value can be 
interpreted as aggressively competitive behaviour relative to the Bertrand behaviour. The 
value of zero implies just multi-product Bertrand pricing assumption. The value of one is the 
case of perfect collusion. But generally these parameters are allowed to take on any values in 
a broad range. If the product is sold in all five geographic markets, there will be five values of 
the market conduct parameter for this product. 
Demand linkages across geographical markets are assumed away: the sales of each car 
model in market m  depend on the prices only in that market and not on the prices for that 
model in the other markets (prohibitive arbitrage costs to the consumers are assumed, this also 
follows from considerable artificial trade barriers).     15
The relationship between consumer (list)  jmt p  and wholesale 
w
jmt p  prices is modelled as 










                                                                                                            (7) 
where  jmt t  is a value added tax in market m , period t for product  j , and  jmt τ  is a dealer 
markup in market m , period t for product  j
24. 
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The  mt J  pricing equations can be further expressed in matrix form for all models that are 
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where 
own Ξ , 
comp Θ  are ownership matrices:  , 1
own
ij Ξ = , if i and  j  are produced by the same 
firm, and zero otherwise, and 
comp
ij j ϕ Θ= if the products i and  j  are produced by different 
firms. This value will be an average value for product  j  with respect to the products of its 
competitors in market m  in period t. The vector ϕ  for J  products is obtained
26. 
own Ξ , 
comp Θ  
are the matrices of the same dimension  mt J  (i.e., the number of products in market m  in 
period t).  Δ is a matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities, also of dimension  mt J . Thus, I 
have got an element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of the same dimension. 
The marginal cost for product  j  in market m  in period t takes up the following form: 
exp( ) jmt jmt s f m t jmt cw w w w w ω φ =+ + + + +                                                                            (10) 
where  jmt ω  are the product characteristics other than price, ϕ  is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated,  s w ,  f w ,  m w ,  t w  are the fixed effects for production locations, firms, markets and 
time, respectively, and  jmt ω  is an iid error term. 
In addition, to examine the roots for why a firm takes into account the behaviour of other 
firms while setting prices in a particular market, I allow ϕ  depending upon firm, geographic 
and product market characteristics  jmt z  that may help explain the deviation in prices across 
the same products across different markets, including concentration and multimarket contact: 
                                                 
24   Some information on the dealer discounts in the European car market can be found in Verboven (1996). 
In particular, in 1990 the maximum dealer markups were 11% in Belgium, 8% in France, 10% in 
Germany, 10% in Italy, and 15% in the UK. 
25    Here I follow Goldberg and Verboven (2001) in the derivation of the first-order conditions and, 
subsequently, price expressions. The authors derive the first-order conditions accounting for absolute and 
relative import quotas. I do not take into account import quotas in my estimations, following Brenkers 
and Verboven (2006a) but allow having conjectural variations parameters in the pricing equation. 
26    For homogenous products in case of market power the following equation is written down: 
1
() MRP Q λ
α
=+ , where α  is the price sensitivity parameter, and λ  is the market conduct 
parameter.   16
jmt jmt s f m t jmt z ϕ λη η η η η =+ + + + +                                                                                       (11) 
where λ  is the vector of parameters to be estimated,  jmt η  is an iid disturbance term, and  s η , 
f η ,  m η ,  t η  are the fixed effects for production locations, firms, markets, and time, 
respectively. The fixed effects are important to include into the model to control for 
systematic differences in the market conduct parameter. 
Higher positive values of the conjectures imply more cooperative firm behaviour relative to 
multi-product Bertrand pricing behaviour. Larger negative values of the conjectures imply 
more competitive firm behaviour relative to multi-product Bertrand pricing behaviour. In the 
market conduct equation (11), one would expect a positive relationship between concentration 
and market conduct and a positive relationship between multimarket contact and market 
conduct (for the mutual forbearance hypothesis to hold). In addition to the multimarket 
contact and concentration variables, I include the interaction term between the two and 
attempt to measure the so-called strategic effects of the multimarket contact, e.g., the 
distribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. In 
this case this term should be negative. Concentration and the number of competitors in a 
geographic-product market are used to distinguish between more and less 
competitive/collusive markets in the European car market. 
4.3. Testing multimarket contact firms coalitions 
In addition to testing the direct impact of the multimarket contact measure on the market 
conduct parameter as above (where the so-called “conjectural variation” approach is applied), 
the collusive assumptions could be tested for multimarket contact coalitions in the supply-side 
specification (that is, the so-called “menu” approach is rather applied here). The best supply-
side model specification can be then selected with the help of a statistical test (e.g., 
MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983), Rivers and Vuong (2002)). 
The idea behind this approach is that the multimarket contact firms will jointly maximize 
their profits. The first-order conditions for a multimarket contact firm that internalizes the 
cross-price effects with its competitors can be written down as follows (as compared to 
equation (8) above): 
,
() 0
MMC MMC mt mt
w kmt
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where  mt MMC  is the coalition of firms in market m  in period t, 
mt MMC F  all products of 
multimarket contact firms, including firm  f , in market m  in period t. 
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where  , 1
MMC
ij Ξ=  if i and  j  are produced by multimarket contact firms that behave collusively 
and 0  otherwise (the same is true for the own products of the firm). That is, as compared to 
the approach that I have just discussed in the section above, where I estimate conjectural 
variation parameters, I test for the assumption that the conjectural variation parameters are 
equal to 1, i.e., I test for the case of perfect collusion among multimarket contact firms in 
market m in period t.   17
5. Data description and estimation procedure 
5.1. Data description 
The dataset on the European car market is maintained by Penny Goldberg and Frank 
Verboven
27. The dataset includes the information on list prices, sales, and technical 
characteristics of cars during 1970-1999 for five European countries: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the UK. The data are rather aggregate, at the level of a model (e.g., VW 
Polo). The average number of models per year is about 100 models. The technical 
characteristics include horsepower, displacement, weight, length, width, height, fuel 
consumption, acceleration time and maximum speed. In addition, there is some data on such 
macroeconomic variables as GDP, exchange rates, population, price indexes, and tax rates. 
Furthermore, there is information on the production location of each model, brand ownership, 
and market segment. The detailed description of the data sources can be found in particular in 
Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Some descriptive statistics for the car dataset (in general and 
across countries) can be found in Table D1 (Appendix D). 
5.2. Estimations steps 
5.2.1. Demand side 
Demand, pricing and market conduct equations are estimated separately
28. On the demand 
side, the two-way error components model is estimated to account for the panel nature of the 
data similar to Brenkers and Verboven (2006a). The structure of the error term is as follows: 
jmt j mt jmt u ξ ξξ =+ + , where  j ξ  does not vary across time (e.g., style),  mt ξ  can account for 
macroeconomic fluctuations in market m  in period t (captured by market/time fixed effects 
dummies),  jmt u  captures the remaining unobserved characteristics. The fixed effects model is 
estimated. A within-transformation of the data is used to control for the product-fixed effects. 
The instruments that I have used in the demand estimation for prices and market shares are 
standard in the literature (for a more detailed discussion of the instruments see Leheyda 
(2007a)). Formally,  |0 jmt Eu z ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ . The instruments have been constructed at group and sub-
group levels: these are the own characteristics of the firm and the sum of characteristics of 
own and competing products in the market segments and in the subgroups of domestic and 
foreign producers as well as the number of own and competing products in the market 
segments and the subgroups of domestic and foreign cars. 
The market share for product j can be written down as: 
( )/(1 ) /(1 )
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 is the distribution of income. It is approximated by the empirical income 
distribution in each country. The market shares of different types of consumers are added 
based on how common that type is. 
                                                 
27   The dataset is available at the website of Prof. Frank Verboven. 
28    I pursue this approach notwithstanding the possible loss in the efficiency, first of all because of 
computational tractability. Step-by-step estimation has been pursued in a number of papers. In particular, 
separate estimation approach for demand, pricing and excess margins equation has been pursued by Slade 
(2004), only the standard errors in the second step have to be adjusted. The estimation steps for the 
demand side are described in Nevo (2000). The Matlab algorithm for random coefficients demand model 
is available from Ariel Nevo's website. I am also very grateful to Prof. Frank Verboven for the 
opportunity to get acquainted with his Gauss code on the demand equation estimation.   18
The above integral has no closed form, therefore, its computation requires aggregation via 
simulation. This procedure has been suggested by Pakes (1986). The market share is 
computed for an average consumer in each income class (10 deciles are distinguished), and 
then the average market share is calculated: 
() / ( 1 ) / ( 1 )
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The following contraction mapping is used to recover the mean utility level  jt δ  by 
minimizing the distance between the observed and predicted sales: 
1
1 (1 max( ,..., ))(ln( ) ln( ( )))
tt t
G ss δδ σ σ δ
+ =+ − −                                                                    (16) 
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These unobservables are then interacted with a set of instruments to get a GMM estimator. 
One searches for the parameter vector that minimizes the objective function 
1 min ' ' Z Z ξ ξ
− Φ
   
                                                                                                                     (18) 
where Φ is a weighting matrix. 
1 ' Z Z
− Φ=  is used as a starting point. 
This search is a non-linear search. The linear parameters β
 
 can be expressed as a function 
of the non-linear parameters α    and σ    
11 1 (' ') ' ' ( ,) XZ ZX XZ Z β δασ
−− − =Φ Φ
                                                                                      (19) 
where σ    includes group and subgroup correlation parameters. The non-linear search can be, 
thus, limited to the non-linear parameters α  and σ . 
The quasi-Newton gradient-based algorithm is used as a search method
29. The asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix takes up the following form: 
( ( ') ' ( ') ) A v C o v i n vZX G w ZX G =                                                                                           (20) 
where  G  is the gradient of the objective function with respect to price and group and 
subgroup correlation parameters, and w is some weighting matrix. 
5.2.2. Substitution patterns 
The two-level nested logit has the assumption that consumers tastes have an extreme value 
distribution but allows consumer tastes to be correlated (in a restrictive way) across product j 
(correlations between groups and subgroups are modelled in a simple way). This allows for 
more reasonable substitution patterns as compared to a simple logit. Consumer heterogeneity 
that enters through the price-income coefficient also allows getting more reasonable 
elasticities and markups as compared to the usual (restricted) two-level nested logit. The 
calculation of the own- and cross-price elasticities because of additional consumer 
heterogeneity becomes, however, more burdensome. 
                                                 
29   This method requires the calculation of a Hessian as well as gradients and Jacobians. The secant method 
(Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno) is used to update the Hessian instead of computing it at every 
iteration. The quasi-Newton methods are similar to Newton methods. They are both based upon the 
calculation of first and second derivatives. The only difference is that under the quasi-Newton methods 
the Hessian is not calculated but approximated (Gauss tutorial).   19
The own price elasticity  / jj s p E  of the market share  j s  of product  j  (taking into account 
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The cross-price elasticity  / jm s p E  of the market share of product  j  with respect to the price 
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The cross-price elasticity  / jk s p E  of the market share of product  j  with respect to the price 
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The cross-price elasticity  / jl s p E  of the market share of product  j  with respect to the price 
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Each individual has a different price sensitivity, which is averaged to a mean price 
sensitivity using the individual probabilities of purchase as weights. The integrals have to be 
calculated by simulation using the knowledge of the distribution of different types of 
consumers. 
5.2.3. Estimation of conduct parameters 
Conduct parameters for a product could be more precisely calculated once the marginal costs 
were known. Then having the information on the market shares and elasticities, the conduct 
parameters could be estimated from the first-order conditions. The pricing equation (9) is 
difficult to estimate at individual level for heterogenous products in practice. Nevo (1998) 
show the problem of identification of the conjectural variations parameters in the simplest 
case of two single-product firms. That is why, to calculate the market conduct, or conjectural 
variations parameters (which are difficult to identify otherwise at individual level for 
heterogenous products), I follow Brenkers and Verboven (2006a) approach and construct 
them after having estimated the demand side assuming that the marginal costs of producing a 
product  j  in a given country (subgroup hg  group g ) are the same as those in a reference 
country, which is taken to be Belgium (subgroup hg  group g ): 
11
lg () () Be ium Germany ps ps
−− −Ω = −Ω                                                                                          (25)   20
Ω may be written down as  ϕ Δ , which is an element-by-element multiplication of two 
matrices of two dimensions. 
Replacing zeros for competing products in subgroup hg  group g  of product  j  I define 
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                                                                               (26) 
where  1 ij φ =  if the products i and  j  are produced by the same firm, and  ij j φ ϕ =  if the 
products are produced by different firms in subgroup hg  group g  in market m  in period t, 
and  () kf J  is the number of products in subgroup hg  of group g . 
The implied ϕ  for Belgium will be, thus, set to zero by default. Marginal costs could be 
different across countries, or market conduct could be different across countries. Because of 
these considerations it is important to perform sensitivity analysis with estimating only the 
hedonic pricing equation with multimarket contact and concentration measures in addition to 
the market conduct equation with multimarket contact and concentration measures. 
5.2.4. Supply side 
For the pricing/market conduct equations estimations, the data are pooled for all countries, 
and the equation is estimated using OLS, including fixed effects, and with robust standard 
errors to account for possible autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Huber-White sandwich 
estimator of the variance). In case of market conduct equations, the standard errors have to be 
adjusted as the dependent variable is estimated from the above step. Consumer list prices are 
recalculated into wholesale prices taking into account the information on VAT across 
countries as well as information on dealer markups
30. In case of pricing equations the product 
characteristics enter the supply equation in the logarithmic form. 
6. Estimation results 
6.1. Demand side 
The results from the demand-side estimations can be found in Table 1. The price is expressed 
in destination currency, including VAT and dealer markup. Horsepower, width and height 
have got positive and statistically significant signs. Thus, consumers have preferences for 
large and powerful cars. Fuel efficiency has got an expected negative and statistically 
significant sign, i.e., consumers will buy rather fuel-efficient vehicles. Dummy for a foreign 
car producer is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, consumers may have higher 
preferences towards domestic car brands. 
 
 
                                                 
30   Goldberg and Verboven (2001) have experimented with consumer list prices and transaction prices taking 
into account the dealer discounts, but that had little influence on the estimation results.   21
Table 1: European car market: demand estimation results (two-level nested logit) 
Nests: market segment, producer origin 
Dependent variable:  
ln(sj)-ln(s0) 
Sample period: 1970-1999 
Estimation method: GMM 
No. observations: 11549 
 
  coefficient t-statistics 
horsepower 0.01  3.82 
fuel efficiency  -0.03  -3.13 
width 0.03  6.90 
height 0.01  2.95 
foreign car  -0.72  -13.10 
price-income 3.00  5.97 
Sub-group correlation parameter ( hg σ ) 
subcompact 0.88  24.08 
compact 0.74  18.73 
intermediate 0.64  15.40 
standard 0.82  18.75 
luxury 0.30  3.37 
Group correlation parameter ( g σ ) 
subcompact 0.34  6.95 
compact 0.67  13.17 
intermediate 0.51  10.69 
standard 0.74  14.35 
luxury 0.04  0.36 
Source: own estimations 
Note: market/time fixed effects are included but are not reported.  
The signs of the group and subgroup correlation parameters are in general consistent with a 
priori expectations. They are higher in the smaller car market segments, where the car 
customers are expected to be more homogenous (their preferences will be more correlated). 
The only exception is the standard market segment group correlation coefficient, which is 
difficult to interpret. 
The group correlation parameters are lower than the subgroup correlation parameters, and 
both groups of parameters are between 0 and 1, which is consistent with random consumer 
utility maximization. The only problem is a low and statistically insignificant sign of the 
luxury segment group coefficient. The statistical significance and expected signs of the group 
and subgroup correlation parameters support the importance of the two principles of 
differentiation in the car market, namely market segment and producer origin. 
The price-income coefficient, which captures the country-dependent effects of car prices on 
demand and allows for a more flexible demand model, is statistically significant and has got 
an expected negative sign. 
The average own-price elasticities of demand and the estimates of price-cost margins under 
single-product and multi-product (firm) Bertrand-Nash pricing assumptions can be found in 
Table 2. Their pattern is in general consistent with a priori expectations, with the exception of 
probably the standard market segment, but this result may have been already anticipated from 
the group and subgroup correlation parameters estimates for this market segment. I find the 
lowest price elasticities in the luxury car market segment and the highest in the subcompact 
market segment. The difference between the price-cost margins under single-product and 
multi-product pricing assumptions is rather small since due to model aggregation many firms   22
have got just one brand in a market segment and the cross-price elasticities with respect to the 
own products in the other market segments are usually found to be low. 
Table 2: European car market: own-price elasticities and price-cost margins (averages for 
market segments) 
    Own-price elasticity  Price-cost margins   
  single-product multi-product 
subcompact -4.73  0.07  0.10 
compact -2.70  0.11  0.12 
intermediate -1.83  0.13  0.14 
standard -2.64  0.05  0.05 
luxury -1.19  0.14  0.14 
Source: own estimations 
I have found the lowest own-price elasticities for the cars in Germany, followed by Belgium 
and France, and the highest elasticities in Italy and the UK. This pattern of the elasticities can 
be linked to different per capita income levels: the lower own-price elasticity of demand is 
expected with the higher per capita income (high-income consumers are less price-
responsible). The lowest nominal GDP per capita in common currency is observed in Italy 
and the UK, while Germany has got the highest per capita incomes. Goldberg and Verboven 
(2001) find the lowest own-price elasticities for Italy, followed by Germany, France, 
Belgium, and the highest own-price elasticities in the UK. Their demand model is, however, 
different from the demand model estimation in this paper. Irandoust (1996) finds lower price 
elasticities in Japan, Germany and France than in the UK, Italy, Sweden and the US. Bourdet 
(1988) also finds higher own-price elasticities for the cars in Italy and the UK than in France. 
Elasticities may be also driven by consumer brand loyalty (as compared to income-driven 
elasticities), which one would have expected for example for Italy, where domestic brand 
loyalty for Fiat is perceived to be high, but this pattern (namely low own-price elasticities) has 
not been found in the obtained results. 
6.2. Supply side and testing for mutual forbearance hypothesis 
In this section I present the empirical results of testing for the mutual forbearance hypothesis 
in the European car market. The below presented several hypotheses have been formulated on 
the basis of the research objectives of this study (I have done this for the better presentation of 
the results in this Section): 
Hypothesis H1: General overlap of the markets leads to more cooperative firm behaviour. 
Hypothesis H2: For the mutual forbearance to hold, it may be not just enough to be present 
in several markets. It could be important for firms to have significant shares in those markets 
(impact of share-weighted multimarket contact measure). The effect of the multimarket 
contact on the firm behaviour is stronger in the more concentrated market. 
Hypothesis H3: Concentration contributes to higher prices. 
Hypothesis H4: I test directly for the impact of the “spheres of influence” on the firm 
behaviour considering the multimarket contact firms coalitions. The respect of the “spheres of 
influence” leads to more cooperative behaviour. 
Hypothesis H5: The strategic effects of the multimarket contact could be observed, i.e., the 
redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. 
The result is that the effect of multimarket contact on prices could be weaker in the more 
concentrated markets.   23
6.2.1. Market conduct equation estimations 
The following market conduct equations are estimated: base, with both multimarket contact 
and concentration (number of competitors) measures, and with an interaction term between 
multimarket contact and concentration (number of competitors) variables.    The number of 
markets in which a firm is present and the number of multiple contacts for a firm with its 
competitors have got a statistically insignificant effect on the market conduct parameter (see 
Table 3). The impact of the concentration on the market conduct is, however, negative and 
statistically significant. The lower concentration ratios are, the larger the number of firms that 
are present in the market is, the more competitively the firms are expected to behave relative 
to the Bertrand assumption. The constructed conjectures are found to be the lowest for France, 
Germany and Italy, and do not differ much in magnitude. France is the most concentrated 
market based on C1 concentration ratio, and Italy is the most concentrated market on the basis 
of C4 and C7 concentration ratios. Given this descriptive statistics, the found relationship 
between market conduct and concentration may be not that surprising
31. 
Table 3: European car market: market conduct estimations (1) 
Variable  Sp1 Sp2 Sp3 Sp4 Sp5 Sp6 
MMC1  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001     
MMC2     0.0004  0.0003  0.0003 
C1  -0.007***    -0.007***    
C4   -0.02***    -0.02***   
C8    -0.04***    -0.04*** 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is 
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts). 
The simple count multimarket contact measure has got a statistically significant negative 
effect when C-1 concentration ratio is included (see Table 4) and the share-weighted 
multimarket contact measure has got a statistically significant positive effect in all 
specifications. The values are, however, very low in magnitudes. The higher the simple count 
measure in the contacts markets is, the lower is the market conduct parameter in the home 
market. This result is somewhat difficult to interpret as related to the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis. It should be noted also that there has been evolving theoretical literature that 
multimarket contact may actually raise the intensity of competition (e.g., Thomas and Willig, 
2006). The higher the share-weighted measure due to high market shares in the contact 
markets is, the higher is the market conduct parameter in the market under consideration, the 
more collusively the firms behave. The concentration variables are statistically significant and 







                                                 
31   Waldfogel and Wulf (2006) have found a negative effect of C-4 concentration ratio on prices in the radio 
broadcasting industry.   24
Table 4: European car market: market conduct estimations (2) 
Variable  Sp7 Sp8 Sp9 Sp10  Sp11  Sp12 
MMC3  -0.02***  0.003  0.007     
MMC4     0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
C1  -0.007***    -0.008***    
C4   -0.02***    -0.03***   
C8    -0.04***    -0.05*** 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact 
measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). 
I have also estimated specifications for the supply side, where instead of the concentration 
variables I include the number of competitors in the market (see Table 5). The number of 
competitors is positive and statistically significant in almost all specifications. The larger the 
number of competitors is in the market, the larger reactions of them are expected to the 
actions of the other firms. The sign and significance of the multimarket contact measures is 
similar as in case of including concentration measures. 
Table 5: European car market: market conduct estimations (3) 
Variable  Sp13 Sp14 Sp15 Sp16 Sp17 
MMC1   -0.001     
MMC2    0.0003    
MMC3     -0.02**   
MMC4      0.0001*** 
No.  Comp  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01  0.05*** 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is 
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket 
contact measure). ‘No.Comp’ stands for the number of competitors.  
When the interaction term between multimarket contact and concentration is added (see 
Table 6), the negative sign of the interaction term is obtained, also statistically significant, 
which may speak in favour of the presence of the multimarket contact strategic effects. High 
multimarket contact combined with high market concentration leads to the lower market 
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Table 6: European car market: market conduct estimations (4) 
Variable  Sp18 Sp19 Sp20 Sp21 Sp22 Sp23 
MMC1  0.03*** 0.06*** 0.30***      
MMC2     0.004***  0.008***  0.02*** 
C1  0.007***    0.009***    
C4   -0.01***    -0.008**   
C8    0.01    0.001 
MMCc1  -0.08***    -0.009***    
MMCc4   -0.07***    -0.01***   
MMCc8    -0.31***    -0.02*** 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is 
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts). 
When the interaction term is added in the regressions with simple and share-weighted 
multimarket contact measures, the sign of the interaction term is sensitive towards 
specifications and can be either positive or negative (see Table 7). If it is negative, this may 
be interpreted as the presence of the strategic effects due to the multimarket contact. If it is 
positive one could argue that the effect of the multimarket contact on the firm behaviour is 
stronger in the more concentrated market. 
Table 7: European car market: market conduct estimations (5) 
Variable  Sp24 Sp25 Sp26 Sp27 Sp28 Sp29 
MMC3 0.01  -0.10** -1.28***       
MMC4     -0.0004*** -0.0004*  0.01*** 
C1  -0.0001    -0.02***    
C4   -0.04***    -0.03***   
C8    -0.20***    0.03* 
MMCc1  -0.06***    0.0007***    
MMCc4   0.11**    0.0005**   
MMCc8    1.30***    -0.01*** 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact 
measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). 
I have also estimated the market conduct specification with the interaction term between the 
number of competitors in a market and multimarket contact measures in that market (see 
Table 8). The interaction term is only positive and statistically significant in case of the 
multimarket contact measures at the firm level. This may be interpreted as the evidence for 
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Table 8: European car market: market conduct estimations (6) 
Variable  Sp30 Sp31 Sp32 Sp33 
MMC1 -0.03***       
MMC2   -0.002***    
MMC3     -0.02   
MMC4     0.0001*** 
No. Comp  -0.02*  -0.03**  0.01  0.05*** 
MMCnoComp 0.002***  0.0003***  -0.0001  0.000 
R2  0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is 
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket 
contact measure). ‘No. Comp’ stands for the number of competitors.  
To sum up, it is rather difficult to interpret the whole picture about the multimarket contact 
effects in the European automobile markets on the basis of the market conduct equation 
estimations. Multimarket contact has been found positive and statistically significant only in 
case of share-weighted multimarket contact measure. Negative impact of simple count 
measure has been found. The impact of concentration on the market conduct parameters is 
negative and statistically significant. The number of competitors is positively and statistically 
significantly related to the conjectural variation parameters. Some evidence has been found 
about the existence of the strategic effects of the multimarket contact: higher multimarket 
contact and concentration in the market contribute to the larger deviations from non-
cooperative pricing assumption, but alone both result in lower market reactions (after the 
interaction term is added). A firm with higher multiple multiple market presence will set 
lower prices in the more concentrated markets. 
The above discussion (corresponding to the research objectives and the respective 
hypotheses) has been summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9: European car market: summary of the evidence on mutual forbearance hypothesis 
(market conduct equation) 
   Supported/Not  supported/Inconclusive 
H1  general overlap  not supported: 
    negative impact of simple count measure, 
    insignificant firm-level measures 
H2 concentration  matters  supported: 
    positive impact of share-weighted measure 
H3 concentration  not  supported 
H4  “spheres of influence” supported  (indirectly) 
H5 strategic  effects  supported 
Source: on the basis of own estimations 
6.2.2. Pricing equation estimations  
In addition to the estimation of the market conduct equation, I study the effect of the 
multimarket contact and concentration directly on prices. This is done within the hedonic 
pricing model. The general reduced form for the pricing equation can be written down as 
iii i p ck p =+ , where  i k  is a percentage markup. The following hedonic regression can be 
estimated for the European car market, where the price is expressed as a linear function of the 
cost and market power parameters:   27
ln( ) imt imt imt s f m t imt pxz γ βα α α α α =++ + + + +                                                                     (27) 
where  i x  are the product characteristics other than price,  i z  are the parameters that measure 
the extent the prices diverge away from marginal costs, e.g., concentration, multimarket 
contact, etc., γ  and β  are the vectors of parameters to be estimated,  s α ,  f α ,  m α ,  i α  are the 
fixed effects for production locations, firms, markets, and time, respectively, and  imt α  is an iid 
error term. 
I expect the coefficient on the concentration variable in the pricing equation to be positive 
(the higher the market concentration is, the higher the prices can be charged). If the 
multimarket contact hypothesis is correct, I expect the positive coefficient on the multimarket 
contact variables. The coefficient on the interaction term between multimarket contact and 
concentration can be either positive or negative. If it is positive that could be interpreted that 
profits are higher in the markets where high firm concentration and high multimarket contact 
coincide. If the negative effect is found that may be attributed to the presence of the strategic 
effects due to the multimarket contact, i.e., the redistribution of the market power from the 
more collusive to the more competitive markets. 
Prices, concentration and multimarket contact (also market conduct) may be rather 
endogenously determined. Thus, concentration and multimarket contact variables need to be 
instrumented in the pricing/market conduct equations. Some endogeneity may be captured by 
introducing market fixed effects. This is the strategy that I pursue in this paper (it has been 
rather difficult to find appropriate instruments). 
Similar to the market conduct equation, several specifications for the pricing side have been 
estimated: base, with both multimarket contact and concentration (number of competitors) 
measures, and with an interaction term between concentration (number of competitors) and 
multimarket contact measures. 
As for the first two variables to measure multimarket contact (i.e., the number of markets in 
which a firm is present, and the number of multiple contacts for a firm), they have been found 
to be positive and statistically significant (see Table 10), although their impact is quite low in 
magnitude. Thus, the higher multiple presence of a firm as well as the higher number of 
pairwise contacts may lead to higher prices. 
As for the concentration ratios, only C4 has been found to be statistically significant, and 
higher in magnitude than the multimarket contact measure coefficient
32. That is, concentration 
may facilitate higher prices and profits in the automobile markets. 
Fixed effects allow estimating whether there are significant price differences across markets 
after adjusting for car model specification differences. Market-time fixed effects are the 
highest in Germany and the UK. Fixed effects for the market segments are the lowest in the 







                                                 
32   This may be also the most adequate and suitable concentration measure for the automobile market.   28
Table 10: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (1)) 
Variable  Sp1 Sp2 Sp3 Sp4 Sp5  Sp6  Sp7 
horse  0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***  0.50***  0.50*** 
weight 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***  0.42***  0.42*** 
width  -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06  -0.05  -0.06 
height  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
const  3.34*** 3.40*** 3.24*** 3.32*** 3.41***  3.26***  3.33*** 
mmc1    0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***      
mmc2      0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0002***
c1   -0.004    -0.005     
c4    0.09***     0.09***   
c8     0.05      0.05 
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.97  0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts). 
The simple multimarket contact measure has been found to be positive and statistically 
significant (see Table 11). The sign and statistical significance of the share-weighted 
multimarket contact measure is not so straightforward. The quantitative impact of the 
multimarket contact measures on prices is quite low. 
The share-weighted multimarket contact measure, which is constructed at the geographic-
product market level, could be interpreted in the following way: the slack in the other markets 
(market power in the non-home markets as measured by concentration) due to multimarket 
contact enhances collusion in a market under consideration. This measure captures the trade-
off between the benefit of the aggressive action in the focal market and the cost of retaliation 
in the other contact markets. This measure was found to be negative and not statistically 
significant in case of C1 and C8 ratios. It is positive and statistically significant in case of C4 
ratio, but very low in magnitude. So when I account for concentration in the contact markets, 
the multimarket contact seems not to have any significant economic effect on prices. 
Table 11: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (2)) 
Variable  Sp8 Sp9 Sp10  Sp11  Sp12  Sp13 
horse  0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
weight  0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
width -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
height  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
const  3.25*** 3.16*** 3.30*** 3.34*** 3.18*** 3.24*** 
mmc3  0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***      
mmc4     -0.000  0.000**  -0.0002* 
c1  -0.01    -0.001    
c4   0.06***    0.09***   
c8    -0.04    0.06* 
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). 
I have also included the number of competitors in a market as a measure of competition 
intensity (see Table 12). It has been found negative and statistically significant. This could   29
also shed light whether the entry of foreign producers, although small ones, has increased 
competition in the automobile markets. An increase in the number of competitors is correlated 
with a decrease in the price of products. The number of competitors might be a more suitable 
measure of market segment competition intensity (internal factor) as compared to the 
concentration measure. 
Table 12: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (3)) 
Variable  Sp14 Sp15 Sp16 Sp17 Sp18 
horse  0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
weight  0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
width -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
height  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
const  3.26*** 3.31*** 3.32*** 3.23*** 3.19*** 
mmc1   0.002***     
mmc2    0.0002***    
mmc3     0.002***   
mmc4      -0.00001*** 
No.  comp -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.007*** 
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count 
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). ‘No. comp’ stands for the number of firms in a 
geographic-product market.  
When the interaction term between concentration and multimarket contact is added to study 
the strategic effects of the multimarket contact (see Table 13), the sign of the interaction term 
is statistically significant and positive when C1 and C4 concentration measures are included
33. 
This may be interpreted as that the multimarket contact measured at the firm level combined 
with higher concentration in a given market contributes to higher prices in the market under 
consideration. That is, multimarket contact leads to more collusion in the more concentrated 
markets. 
Table 13: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (4))  
Variable  Sp19 Sp20 Sp21 Sp22 Sp23 Sp24 
MMC1  0.00  -0.005***  0.009**     
MMC2     -0.00  -0.001***  0.0005 
C1  -0.07***    -0.11***    
C4   -0.05    -0.14***   
C8    0.18**    0.10 
MMCc1  0.004***    0.001***    
MMCc4   0.008***    0.001***   
MMCc8    -0.01*    -0.0003 
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts). Product characteristics are 
included but are not reported. 
                                                 
33   Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) have also found that multimarket contact and concentration have become 
statistically insignificant after the interaction term has been included. The interaction term itself was 
statistically significant and positive.   30
The interaction term is statistically significant and negative for the simple count and share-
weighted multimarket contact measures (See Table 14). Thus, I can argue that there is some 
evidence on existence of the strategic effects of the multimarket contact, i.e., the redistribution 
of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. 
Table 14: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (5))  
Variable  Sp25 Sp26 Sp27  Sp28  Sp29 Sp30 
MMC3 0.06***  -0.0001 0.04***       
MMC4      0.00005***  0.0001***  0.0005*** 
C1 0.04      0.09***     
C4   0.02      0.17***   
C8    0.36***     0.39*** 
MMCc1 -0.005*      -0.00008***     
MMCc4   0.004      -0.0001***   
MMCc8    -0.04***     -0.0005***
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97  0.97  0.97 0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). Product 
characteristics are included but are not reported.  
I have also estimated the pricing equation with the interaction term between multimarket 
contact measures and the number of competitors in a market (see Table 15). It is negative and 
statistically significant, which may be interpreted that prices are lower in the markets 
characterized by higher multimarket contact and larger number of competitors (thus, higher 
competition intensity). This could be interpreted as some evidence in favour of the presence 
of the strategic effects due to multimarket contact. 
Table 15: European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation (6))  
Variable  Sp31 Sp32 Sp33 Sp34 
MMC1  0.006***     
MMC2   0.0008***    
MMC3    0.008***   
MMC4     -0.000*** 
No.  Comp  0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.008*** 
MMCnoComp  -0.0004*** -0.00006***  -0.0008*** -0.000*** 
R2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car 
characteristics are expressed in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count 
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). ‘No. Comp’ stands for the number of competitors in a 
market. Product characteristics are included but are not reported.  
To sum up, in general multimarket contact is positively related to prices (in most 
specifications) - a result, which is consistent with mutual forbearance reducing competition. 
Greater levels of mulimarket contact move prices above marginal costs. However, although 
the relationship is statistically significant, the multimarket contact effect has little economic 
influence on the prices of the car producers. Higher concentration leads to higher prices. 
Multimarket contact firms forbear from retaliating more in a concentrated market. Some 
evidence has been found about the existence of the strategic multimarket contact effects: 
higher multimarket contact and concentration contribute to lower prices. The summary of the 
found effects is given in Table 16.   31
Table 16: European car market: summary of the evidence on the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis (pricing equation) 
  Supported/Not 
supported/Inconclusive 
H1 general  overlap  Supported 
H2 conc.  matters  Supported 
H3 concentration  Supported 
H4  “spheres of influence”  Supported (implicitly) 
H5 strategic  effects  Supported 
Source: on the basis of own estimations 
6.2.3. Results from testing coalitions of multimarket firms  
The construction of the multimarket contact measures allows me to study the general effect of 
the multimarket contact presence, i.e., the extent of the market overlap in the industry, on 
facilitating collusive behaviour as well as the role of concentration. To some extent, the 
impact of the “spheres of influence” might have been captured through the construction of the 
share-weighted multimarket contact measure. To test explicitly for the effectiveness of the 
“territorial interests”, or “spheres of influence” (i.e., Hypothesis H4) I have tried to point out 
the so-called multimarket contact firms coalitions. These coalitions have been pointed out on 
the basis of the constructed multimarket contact measures and on the basis of the discussed 
picture of multiple market presence in the European car market. The idea has been to test for 
collusive behaviour among these firms as it has been explained above (see Section 4.3). 
The firms that are present in the largest number of markets and have got the largest number 
of multiple contacts over the considered period of time are VW, Fiat, GM, Ford and Peugeot. 
This coalition of firms could be treated as a multimarket contact firms coalition, and the 
collusive assumption among the firms in this coalition could be tested as a potential 
equilibrium outcome. 
Not only the diversification aspect matters (to support collusion due to multimarket contact 
it is not enough to be present in several markets) but also the ability of the firms to use it in 
the creation of the transferrable slack should be taken into account. It is unlikely that the firms 
with a small market share will be able to generate the necessary slack (which is usually 
fostered by market concentration), which could be transferred to the other markets through the 
multimarket contact. On the basis of the above described picture of multiple market presence 
by the automobile companies, several potential multimarket coalitions can be pointed out. The 
firms that have more than 5% market share in each geographic market are Ford, GM, Peugeot, 
Renault, and VW. The firms that have more than 5% market share in each or at least four 
product markets are Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW, with 1% market share these are Fiat, Ford, GM, 
Peugeot, Renault, and VW. Firms that are present in all geographic-product markets and have 
more than 1% share in each geographic-product market are Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW. 
Small firms like Daihatsu are unlikely to be engaged into implicit collusive arrangements 
with large players like VW. Such arrangements are most likely to be among the “influential” 
rivals. These “influential” players are likely to respect each other’s “territorial interests”. That 
is why, in addition I have considered defining an “influential firm” for each geographic-
product market and for each year (i.e., a firm with the highest market share), and then testing 
collusive behaviour among such firms. This would allow me to test directly for the presence 
of the “spheres of influence” that could foster collusive behaviour. On the basis of such 
analysis, I have found that the same firms seem to dominate the markets during the observed 
period of time: Alfa Romeo (later belongs to Fiat), Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes, Peugeot, 
Renault, Ford, GM, and Rover (later belongs to BMW).    32
Under this approach (testing multimarket contact firms coalitions) I do not consider the 
possibility that there could be different degrees of cooperative behaviour across the markets. 
Basically I try to differentiate between the two extreme cases: no collusion at all (as 
represented by single-product, or multi-product assumptions), or collusive behaviour between 
multimarket contact firms in all markets, which I attribute to multimarket contact presence. 
The following candidates for the equilibrium firm interactions in the European car market 
have been considered: A1: single-product assumption, A2: multiproduct (brand) assumption, 
A3: multiproduct (firm) assumption, A4: collusive assumption for firms that have more than 
5% market share in each geographic market: Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault and VW and single-
product assumption for all other firms, A5: collusive assumption for firms that have more 
than 5% market share in each geographic market: Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault and VW and 
multi-product (brand) assumption for all other firms, A6: collusive assumption for firms that 
have more than 5% market share in each product market: Fiat, Ford, GM and VW and single-
product assumption for all other firms, A7: collusive assumption for firms that have more 
than 5% market share in each product market: Fiat, Ford, GM and VW and multi-product 
(brand) assumption for all other firms, A8: collusive assumption for firms that have more than 
1% market share in each market: Fiat, Ford, GM, VW, Peugeot and Renault and single-
product assumption for all other firms, A9: collusive assumption for firms that have more 
than 1% market share in each market: Fiat, Ford, GM, VW, Peugeot and Renault and multi-
product (brand) assumption for all other firms, A10: collusive assumption for firms that have 
“spheres of influence”: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes, Peugeot, Renault, GM, 
Ford and Rover and single-product assumption for all other firms, A11: collusive assumption 
for firms that have “spheres of influence”: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes, Peugeot, 
Renault, GM, Ford and Rover and multi-product (brand) assumption for all other firms, A12: 
collusive assumption for firms that are present in the largest number of markets and have the 
highest number of multiple contacts: VW, Fiat, GM, Ford and Peugeot, and single-product 
assumption for all other firms, A13: collusive assumption for firms that are present in the 
largest number of markets and have the highest number of multiple contacts: VW, Fiat, GM, 
Ford and Peugeot, and multi-product (brand) assumption for all other firms. 
On the basis of the multimarket contact firms coalitions that have been pointed out above I 
have tested for the best supply-side specification (i.e., the specification that best fits the data). 
I present and discuss the results from several testing procedures: information criteria, test for 
non-nested hypothesis (MacKinnon, White, and Davidson, 1983) and model selection test 
(Rivers and Vuong, 2002). 
As it can be seen from Table 17, the single-product and multi-product (brand) Bertrand-
Nash assumptions have got the lowest information criteria and sum of squared residuals (there 
is only a slight difference in the markups under these two assumptions). There appears also 
little difference between multi-product (brand) and multiproduct (firm) assumptions, which 
could shed more light on the intrabrand competition within an automobile manufacturer 
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Table 17: European car market: information criteria and sum of squared residuals (SSR) for 
different supply side specifications 
Specifications AIC  BIC  SSR 
A1 9429.46  10054.58  1507.53 
A2 9426.52  10051.64  1507.15 
A3 9516.45  10141.57  1518.93 
A4 9798.20  10423.32  1556.44 
A5 9758.53  10383.65  1551.11 
A6 9990.87  10615.99  1582.63 
A7 9984.40  10609.52  1581.74 
A8 9803.40  10428.52  1557.15 
A9 9802.63  10427.75  1557.04 
A10 9717.68  10342.80  1545.63 
A11 9718.82  10343.94  1545.78 
A12 10029.1  10654.22  1587.88 
A13 10027.65  10652.77  1587.68 
Source: own estimations Note: ‘AIC’ stands for Akaike information criterion, ‘BIC’ stands for Bayesian information criterion, and ‘SSR’ 
stands for the squared sum of residuals.  
In addition I have conducted the test for non-nested hypotheses by MacKinnon, White and 
Davidson (1983) (see Tables 18a,b). The intuition behind this test is that if the price-cost 
margin from a given model has a statistically significant impact on the price-cost margin from 
another model, that means that the latter model should be rejected. This test is very easy to 
implement in practice. Within this approach, the two non-nested models are embedded into a 
more general artificial model. On the basis of the test results, it is, however, difficult to 
choose the ‘best’ supply-side specification. When the alternative assumptions are A4-A9, all 
the null hypothesis are rejected, i.e., these should be the preferred specifications (but they 
perform only slightly better as compared to the other specifications). Given that the difference 
between single- and multi-product (brand) assumptions is small, basically for the A4-A9 
assumptions the plausibility of the three coalitions of multimarket contact firms should be 
investigated: 1) Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault, and VW; 2) Ford, GM, VW, and Fiat, and 3) 
Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault, VW, and Fiat. The open question is how to choose among these 
“best” supply-side specifications. 
Table 18a: European car market: results of the test for the non-nested hypotheses 
(MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983) 
H0/H1  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
A1    8.58  11.16 12.79 13.89 13.54 13.92 
A2  -4.64   8.60  12.90 12.02 11.62 12.10 
A3  1.73  1.47    12.99 10.79 8.13  9.01 
A4  -10.04  -9.98  -9.92    -4.38  -4.33 
A5  -9.91 -8.68 -1.32 24.39   3.88  4.21 
A6  -1.25 -2.10 -6.86 9.19  7.94    5.65 
A7  -1.61 -2.53 -7.68 9.28  7.70  -5.52  
A8  -4.57 -5.24 -7.49 -8.44 -2.09 -5.94 -5.61 
A9  -4.75 -5.45 -7.76 -8.44 -2.38 -6.23 -5.93 
A10  -10.05 -10.65 -12.29 -10.22 -9.77  -11.28 -11.12 
A11  -10.04 -10.65 -12.28 -10.22 -9.76  -11.27 -11.12 
A12  -2.90 -3.81 -7.82 5.22  4.90  -5.58 -4.81 
A13  -3.16 -4.13 -8.30 5.27  4.65  -6.23 -5.59 
Source: own estimations   34
Table 18b: European car market: results of the test for the non-nested hypotheses 
(MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983) (continuation) 
H0/H1  A8 A9 A10  A11  A12  A13 
A1  16.95 17.16 21.30 21.31 14.83 15.13 
A2  15.70 19.95 20.46 20.47 13.18 13.54 
A3  13.37 13.67 18.96 18.96 10.26 10.79 
A4  12.43 12.43 14.62 14.62 0.21  0.28 
A5  13.21 13.53 19.68 19.69 7.67  8.00 
A6  12.55 12.85 18.83 18.83 7.98  8.66 
A7  12.31 12.66 18.79 18.80 7.22  8.04 
A8    4.57  15.49 15.49 -4.76 -4.33 
A9  -4.48   15.35 15.36 -5.15 -4.76 
A10  -11.28 -11.07   -0.35  -10.87 -10.70 
A11  -11.27 -11.07 0.41    -10.87 -10.70 
A12  11.00 11.39 18.35 18.35   5.29 
A13  10.64 11.11 18.28 18.29 -5.18  
Source: own estimations 
Note: t-statistics are given in the cells.  
The results of Rivers and Vuong (2002) test could not shed more light on the above results. 
I have failed to select any supply-side specification on the basis of this test. 
To sum up, on the basis of the statistical procedures that I have done it has been difficult to 
choose the model that best describes the firms’ equilibrium interactions. That is why, I have 
to rely on the results from the estimation of market conduct and pricing equations estimations 
in the above sections to draw some conclusions about the effect of multimarket contact on the 
firm behaviour in the automobile markets. 
7. Conclusions 
The paper has been an attempt to analyze the conduct behaviour of the automotive firms in 
the European car market in a systematic way. I have extended the earlier models for the 
European car market in particular by augmenting the supply side through explicitly 
considering the factors that contribute to market conduct and pricing behaviour of the 
automotive firms. Most previous automotive industry studies have concentrated on explaining 
the international price differentials in the European car market. The focus of this paper has 
been to study the impact of the internal (concentration, number of competitors in a market) 
and external (multimarket contact) factors on the firm behaviour. 
In addition, this study has been motivated by the presence of extensive multimarket contact 
in the automobile industry, which is generally argued to foster collusive behaviour and which 
has not received interest in the previous automotive studies. Industry consolidation has raised 
the level of the multimarket contact. The concentration ratios for the total European car 
market have stayed on average at the same level or declined during the considered period of 
time, while the multimarket contact has increased. The number of competitors has also grown, 
in particular due to the entrance of Japanese competitors. 
Finally, the study has been motivated by the lack of conclusive empirical evidence (in 
general, not only for automobile markets) on the mutual forbearance hypothesis. It has been 
first formulated by Edwards (1955), i.e., the extended interdependence when firms meet each 
other in several markets may lead to tacitly collusive arrangements between the firms. The 
hypothesis has been formally described for the first time by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). 
The estimation of the conjectures equations helps me to see whether they can be really   35
attributable to the multimarket contact, while some studies just estimated conjectures and 
attributed them to the mutual forbearance presence (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller, 1987). 
It has been found that the general overlap of the markets may lead to more cooperative firm 
behaviour. For the mutual forbearance to hold, it may be, however, not just enough to be 
present in several markets. It could be important for firms to have “spheres of influence” in 
those markets. The effect of the multimarket on the firm behaviour is stronger in the more 
concentrated market. Concentration alone also contributes to higher prices. The strategic 
effects of the multimarket contact could be observed in the European car market, i.e., the 
redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets. 
The result is that multimarket contact may lead to lower prices in the more concentrated 
markets. I have tested directly for the impact of the “spheres of influence” on the firm 
behaviour considering multimarket contact firms coalitions. However, it was difficult to 
choose the best supply-side model on the basis of the statistical procedures that I have 
applied. Thus, to sum up, the results of the study reveal some weak quantitative effect of 
multimarket contact on pricing/market conduct in the European car market as well as provide 
some evidence on designing strategic policies by the automotive firms and shifting their 
market power across the markets, in which they operate. 
Because of weak economic impact of multimarket contact on competition, one may argue 
that multimarket contact notwithstanding its extensive presence in the automobile industry 
does not play a large role. The results of the study may, therefore, raise the question whether 
sector differences (e.g., industry structure, demand growth prospects) could account for the 
different effect of multimarket contact on competitive behaviour. In particular, the economic 
effects of the multimarket contact have been found to be much stronger for airlines, hotels, 
mobile telephone markets, etc. (e.g., Evans and Kessides (1994), Jans and Rosenbaum (1996), 
Parker and Roller (1997), Fernandez and Marin (1998)). In those industries a larger number of 
markets is observed. As compared to the other multimarket contact studies (that focus on 
local/regional geographical markets), I have focused on the combination of both geographic 
and product dimensions of markets to measure the degree of multimarket linkages for the 
automotive firms and study the impact of this degree on the firm behaviour. It should be noted 
that some studies report the economic significance of the effect similar to mine, especially 
when similar multimarket contact measures are constructed (e.g., Heggestad and Rhoades 
(1978), Waldfogel and Wulf (2006)). However, the studies by Evans and Kessides (1994) and 
Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) that use similar multimarket contact measures show much 
stronger economic effect of multimarket contact on prices. As compared to my study on the 
mutual forbearance hypothesis for the US car industry (Leheyda, 2007a), I was able to get 
more conclusive evidence on the multimarket contact effects in general. In addition, I could 
find some support for the presence of the strategic effects due to the multimarket contact, i.e., 
the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive 
markets. 
Alternatively, one may argue that the construction of the multimarket contact measures as 
well as pointing out multimarket contact firms coalitions may be not suitable for studying the 
multimarket contact effect on the firm behaviour in the automobile industry and that some 
other approach could be thought of to investigate this issue more profoundly. 
The “ideal” test to study multimarket contact effects on collusive behaviour would be to 
contrast the pricing behaviour in a single-product (e.g., two firms in one market M1) and a 
multiproduct context (e.g., these two firms move together to another market M1+M2) to test 
for incremental effects in the firm behaviour. In addition, one can take some period of time 
and compare the break-down of collusive prices in M1 world and M1+M2 world, and if this 
period of break-downs under the latter scenario is shorter, then this is a hard test for showing 
that the multimarket contact effect leads to more collusion. This situation could be difficult to   36
find in terms of the necessary data in general and for the automobile market in particular. That 
is why, I have been made restricted to applying the suggested in this paper methods to try to 
identify the effects of the presence of the multimarket situations on the firm behaviour in the 
automotive industry. The “ideal” and the developed in this paper methodologies could be 
applied in the context of other industries and markets. 
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9. Appendix A. Multimarket contact measures 
9.1. Simple multimarket contact measure 
The simple count measure is constructed in the following way
34. It is assumed that there are 
1,..., kK =  geographic-product markets and  1,..., nN =  automotive manufacturers. In 
geographic-product market k  there are  k N  automotive firms. Let  nk D  be a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if firm n is present in market k  and zero otherwise. Matrix  () ij A a =  







=∑ . This is a symmetric matrix, where the diagonal 
elements  ii a  are the number of markets in which the firm i is present, and the off-diagonal 













   
 
 
I calculate the average multimarket contact per firm-pair in market k  in the following way: 
1
11
/( ( 1 )/2)
NN
ki j i k j k k k
ij i
AverMarketContact a D D N N
−
== +
=− ∑∑                                                      (28) 
where  k N  is the number of firms in market under consideration k . ( 1) kk NN −  is the total 
number of possible pairs of firms in this market. 
The example below (see Table 19) shows the construction of such a measure for a particular 





                                                 
34   Simple count and market-share weighted measures have been constructed in particular by Evans and 
Kessides (1992) and Jans and Rosenbaum (1996).   40
Table 19: European car market: example of construction of a multimarket-contact measure at 
the geographic-product market level 
 BMW  Fiat  Ford  Honda  GM  Peugeot VW  Daewoo  Sum 
BMW 19  19  19  13  19  13  19  17  119 
Fiat   25 25 14 25 19  25 18  126 
Ford     25  14  25  19  25  18  101 
Honda       14  14  13  14  12  53 
GM         25 19  25 18  62 
Peugeot           19  19  18  37 
VW             25 18  18 
Daewoo               18   
Sum                 516 
MMC                 18.43 
Source: own estimations 
The diagonal elements in the above Table are the number of geographic-product markets, in 
which a firm is present. The off-diagonal elements show the number of geographic-product 
markets in which both firms meet each other. The number of these contacts (off-diagonal 
elements) is aggregated for each firm and is given in the last column. The contacts are 
aggregated for all firms (516) and then they are divided by the number of possible firm pairs 
in this market ( ( 1)/ 2 28 kk NN −= ) to get the multimarket contact measure of 18.43 for 
Italy’s standard market segment in 1999. 
This measure is calculated for each geographic-product market and for each year (which is 
extremely time-consuming). If there is only one automotive firm in the market, the measure 
will be equal to zero. 
The impact of this measure on the firm behaviour may be interpreted in the following way: 
facing a trade-off between the benefit of the aggressive action in the focal market (i.e., the 
market under consideration) and the cost of the rival retaliation in the other contact markets, 
the firms may tend to behave less aggressively. 
9.2. Share-weighted multimarket contact measure 
Relatively more important markets could be given some greater weight in the multimarket 
contact measure, which leads me to the construction of the next measure. 
I construct a quadratic weighting multimarket contact measure in the following way. The 
revenue share of firm i from market k  ( ik R ) is multiplied by the revenue share of firm  j  
from the same market k , which is then used to weight the contribution of the pairwise contact 







=∑ . This is a symmetric matrix. 
I calculate the average revenue-weighted market contact in the following way: 
1
11
Re /( ( 1)/ 2)
NN
ki j i k j k k k
ij i
AverMarket venueContact r D D N N
−
== +
=− ∑∑                                        (29) 
The construction of this measure is similar to the construction of the simple multimarket 
contact measure, except for the fact that the measure is weighted by the market shares of the 
firm.   41
The interpretation of this measure is similar to the one of the simple multimarket contact 
measure above. If this measure value is small, the potential cost of retaliation is low as 
compared to the benefit of the aggressive behaviour in the focal/home market (i.e., the market 
under consideration). If it is high, the multimarket contact may exert large influence upon the 
focal market behaviour, and higher prices in that market should be observed. This measure 
captures that in the more concentrated markets the firms might have more to lose, thus, they 
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Appendix B. European car market: general descriptive statistics 
(concentration, multiple market presence and ownership) 
Graph B1: European car market: development of concentration ratios (one-firm (C1), four-
firm (C4), seven-firm (C7)) over time at country market level 
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Table B2: European car market: purchase taxes on new vehicles, 1999 
Country  VAT (%)  Purchase taxes  Registration fees  
(in local currency) 
Belgium  21  Based on capacity and age  2500 FB 
France  20.6  None  Local tax 102 to 195 FF 
(+ parafiscal charges) 
Germany   16  None  50 DM 
Italy  20  Provincial, based on fiscal 
power 
300000 to 720000 L 
United 
Kingdom 
17.5 None  None 
Source: Gaulier and Haller (2000)   44
Table B3: European car market: shares in a firm’s total European sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
  Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  UK  ‘Spheres of influence’ 
  1970  1999 1970 1999  1970 1999  1970 1999 1970 1999 1970  1999 
Alfa Romeo  2.32    6.38    10.50   79.01   1.78   Italy   
BMW  5.93  3.88 5.30 8.52  80.07 45.90  5.89 12.01  2.80 29.69  Germany  Germany 
Daihatsu   1.70       68.03   5.35   24.92    Germany 
Fiat  3.43  2.15  20.76 10.68  11.57 10.54  62.57 68.98 1.66 7.65 Italy  Italy 
Ford  4.97  4.11 6.74 13.75  32.30  28.33  10.08  17.41  45.91 36.40 UK UK 
Honda 18.22  4.19  45.07  7.69  36.71 29.64    10.67   47.81  France UK 
DeTomaso         100.00     I t a l y    
Hyundai   4.30    5.87    22.47   37.81   29.55    Italy 
Kia   8.07    5.88   66.83   16.80   8.30    Germany 
Mazda   7.02       67.06   4.10   15.94    Germany 
Mercedes  3.91  3.37 5.28 7.54  85.29 66.52  4.65 11.83  0.88 10.74  Germany  Germany 
Mitsubishi    13.22   3.25    60.18   4.11   19.23    Germany 
Nissan  100.00  4.79   9.47   27.21   18.17   40.37  Belgium UK 
GM  4.83  4.34 4.93 10.78  63.59 42.88  8.34  15.93 18.31 26.07 Germany  Germany 
Peugeot 5.54  5.82  81.06 49.43  10.91 10.96  2.49  12.75   21.04 France  France 
Renault 5.28  4.77  61.96 49.09  22.06 19.20  6.05  11.82 4.65  15.12 France  France 
FujiHi   100.00              Belgium 
Rover  2.72    3.61   2.46   0.33  90.89   UK   
Saab  56.73      4 3 . 2 7         B e l g i u m    
Suzuki    8.97   11.51    39.89   10.60   29.03    Germany 
Toyota     87.57  8.94   11.80    30.48    20.05 12.43 28.73 Belgium  Germany 
VW  3.60  5.03 2.93 12.63  80.43 55.07  8.77 14.94  4.28 12.33  Germany    Germany 
Volvo  26.81    13.29   27.78   3.89   28.22   UK   
DAF 21.34    21.11   33.53    11.72   12.30   Germany     
TalbotSimca 5.71   35.61    15.94   16.54   26.21   France     
TalbotMatra 5.92   94.08           France     
Daewoo   4.13    10.18   9.52    51.86   24.31    Italy 
Daimler (Smart)      7.29   67.95   24.76      Germany 
Total market sales 4.66  4.57  21.91  19.85  34.36 34.26  23.15 20.74 15.93 20.58 Germany    Germany 
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
Note: ‘Spheres of influence’ (‘market dependence’) are defined as those geographical markets where a firm has the highest market share in a firm’s total European sales.  45
Table B4: European car market: shares of a firm in total market sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
  Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  UK  Europe  ‘Spheres of influence’ 
  1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999  1970  1999 
Alfa  Romeo  0.77   0.45   0.47  5.26   0.17   1.54    Italy   
Daihatsu   0.07      0.38   0.05   0.23   0.47    Germany 
BMW  2.46 4.86 0.47 2.45 4.49 7.67 0.49 3.31 0.34 8.25 1.93 5.72  Germany  Germany 
Fiat  18.45  4.91 23.70 5.62 8.43 3.21 67.63 34.71 2.61 3.88 25.02 10.44 Italy  Italy 
Ford  10.28  10.71  2.96 8.26 9.05 9.86 4.19 10.01 27.73 21.09 9.62 11.92 UK  UK 
Honda  0.21  1.07 0.11 0.45 0.06 1.01   0.60   2.72  0.05 1.17  Belgium  UK 
Hyundai   0.83   0.26   0.58   1.60   1.26   0.88    Italy 
DeTomaso        3.76     0.87    Italy   
Kia   0.47      0.52   0.22   0.11   0.27    Germany 
Mazda   1.84   0.36   2.35   0.24   0.93   1.20    Germany 
Mercedes  2.55 3.85 0.73 1.98 7.56 10.14 0.61 2.98 0.17 2.73 3.04 5.22  Germany  Germany 
Mitsubishi   1.64   0.09   0.99   0.11   0.53   0.57    Belgium 
Nissan  1.02  2.54   1.16   1.93   2.12   4.76  0.05 2.42  Belgium  UK 
GM 11.10  11.58  2.41  6.62  19.81 15.27 3.86 9.37 12.30  15.45 10.70 12.20 Germany  UK 
Peugeot 7.29  16.70  22.67 32.68 1.95 4.20 0.66 8.07   13.42 6.13 13.13 France  France 
Renault 13.25  10.48  33.04 24.84 7.50 5.63 3.06 5.72 3.41 7.38 11.68 10.05 France  France 
FujiHi   0.04           0.00    Belgium 
Rover  3.90   1.10   0.48   0.09  38.14   6.69    UK   
Saab  0.21     0.02       0.02    Belgium  
Suzuki   0.62   0.18   0.37   0.16   0.45   0.32    Belgium 
Toyota  3.59 4.54   1.38   2.07   2.25 0.15 3.24 0.19 2.32  Belgium  Belgium 
VW 12.06  22.06  2.08  12.76 36.51 32.25 5.91 14.46 4.19 12.02 15.60 20.06 Germany  Germany 
Volvo  2.96   0.31   0.42   0.09   0.91   0.51    Belgium  
DAF  2.87   0.60   0.61   0.32   0.48   0.63    Belgium  
TalbotSimca 7.00   9.28   2.65   4.08   9.39   5.71    France,  UK   
TalbotMatra 0.02   0.08         0.02    France   
Daewoo   1.18   0.67   0.36   3.28   1.55       Italy 
Daimler     0.23   1.22   0.74     0.62    Germany 
Total  market  sales 100.0   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0   100.0      
C-1    18.45 22.06 33.04 32.68 36.51 32.25 67.63 34.71 38.14 21.09 25.02 20.06     
C-4    53.09 61.06 88.69 78.54 73.80 67.51 82.99 68.55 87.57 61.99 63.00 57.31     
C-7    79.44 81.30 96.14 93.24 93.35 85.01 94.68 85.66 97.78 82.38 85.44 83.51     
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
Note: ‘Spheres of influence’ (‘market share dominance’) are reflected by the largest shares the firms hold in different geographical markets.   46
Table B5: European car market: shares of a firm in market segment sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
  Subcompact Compact  Intermediate Standard  Luxury  Total  ‘Spheres of influence’ 
(market share dominance) 
  1970  1999  1970  1999  1970  1999 1970 1999 1970 1999  1970 1999 1970  1999 
Alfa  Romeo    3.89    5.94         1.54   Intermediate   
BMW    0.14 1.89 4.92  4.26    4.83  44.06 12.30 22.11  1.93 5.72 Luxury  Standard 
Daihatsu   0.50        0.03        0.19    Subcompact 
Fiat  39.14 18.46 7.51  4.89  24.97  3.80  12.44 12.90 0.99  6.61  25.02 10.44 Subcompact  Subcompact 
Ford   11.32  16.40  15.05 32.70  13.06 19.64 5.05    3.40  9.62  11.93 Intermediate  Compact 
Honda  0.11  0.28   2.29        5.63      0.05 1.17 Subcompact Standard 
Hyundai   1.03    1.00    0.94        0.88    Subcompact 
DeTomaso 1.77               0.87   Subcompact   
Kia   0.31   0.09   0.62        0.27    Intermediate 
Mazda  0.55   1.77   2.32        1.20    Intermediate 
Mercedes     5.66          82.06 62.79  3.04 5.22 Luxury  Luxury 
Mitsubishi     0.56    2.01        0.57    Compact 
Nissan  0.10  3.20   1.70   3.45     0.37  0.05  2.43  Subcompact  Intermediate 
GM   10.18  26.02  16.82  0.72 12.07  30.70  11.07 4.65  2.83  10.70 12.20 Standard  Compact 
Peugeot  4.82 17.28  6.66 7.06  7.52  22.23 11.03 1.21     6.13 13.13  Standard  Intermediate 
Renault  18.87 16.11 9.40  7.15    8.04   3.16     11.68  10.05  Subcompact Subcompact 
Rover  9.48   4.85       6.31      6.69   Subcompact   
Saab          0.14      0.02   Standard   
Suzuki  0.45       0.58        0.29    Intermediate 
Toyota       2.24  0.74  2.63   3.40    0.19     0.19 2.32 Compact  Intermediate 




Volvo         4.16      0.51   Standard   
DAF  1.27               0.63   Subcompact   
TalbotSimca 7.20    4.75   10.42        5.71   Intermediate   
TalbotMatra            0.16      0.02   Standard   
Daewoo   1.86    1.27    1.01   0.35       1.31   Subcompact 




100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0    
Source: European car market database, own calculations  47
Table B6: European car market: shares of a firm in a firm’s sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
  Subcompact Compact  Intermediate  Standard  Luxury  ‘Spheres of influence’ 
(market dependence) 
  1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999  1970 1999  1970  1999 
Alfa Romeo      64.8   35.2         Compact   
BMW    0.95 25.1 25.93  20.2   31.0  51.48 23.7  21.64  Standard  Standard 
Daihatsu   97.21     2.79          Subcompact 
Fiat  76.89 66.89 7.69 14.12  9.13 7.18 6.15 8.26  0.15 3.55  Subcompact Subcompact 
Ford   35.89  43.69 38.07 31.06 21.60 25.24 2.83    1.60  Compact  Compact 
Honda 100.00  9.07    58.83     32.10     Subcompact Compact 
Hyundai   44.47   34.51   21.02          Subcompact 
DeTomaso  100.00             S u b c o m p a c t  
Kia   43.96   10.59   45.45          Intermediate 
Mazda   17.41    44.44   38.15          Compact 
M e r c e d e s      3 2 . 6 6        100.00  67.34 Luxury  Luxury 
Mitsubishi     29.80   70.20          Intermediate 
Nissan  100.00 49.95   21.15   28.04      0.86  Subcompact Subcompact 
GM   31.55  62.30 41.58 0.61  19.50 35.47 6.07  1.61  1.30  Compact  Compact 
Peugeot  38.67 49.78 27.85 16.21 11.22 33.39 22.25 0.62      Subcompact Subcompact 
Renault  79.37  60.64 20.63 21.47   15.78   2.11      Subcompact Subcompact 
Rover  69.72   18.61     11.67       Subcompact  
S a a b         100.00       Standard   
Suzuki   59.93     40.17          Subcompact 
Toyota       36.46 100.00  34.10   28.88   0.56     Compact  Subcompact 
VW  54.32 27.25 29.39 40.78 7.89  25.99 8.40  5.46    0.53  Subcompact Compact 
V o l v o        100.00       Standard   
DAF  100.00             S u b c o m p a c t  
TalbotSimca  61.99   21.33   16.68         Subcompact  
T a l b o t M a t r a         100.00       Standard   
Daewoo   53.83   29.20   15.20   1.77       Subcompact 
Daimler   100.00              S u b c o m p a c t  
Total 
segment sales 
49.15 37.83 25.64 30.16 9.14  19.72 12.37 6.69  3.71  5.60  Subcompact Subcompact 
Source: European car market database, own estimations 
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Table B7: European car market: geographic-product market presence (defined by shares of a 
firm in a market segment (‘market-share dominance’)), 1999 
  BMW Daihatsu  Fiat  Ford Honda  Hyundai  Kia 
Belgium (BE)             
Subcompact 0.07  0.25  6.67  9.44  0.49  0.72  1.02 
Compact 1.68   3.09  10.52  1.69 1.17  0.05 
Intermediate 0.00    1.90  13.47    0.88  0.67 
Standard 39.40    14.67  7.54  4.53    
Luxury 24.60    6.59  11.22       
France (FR)             
Subcompact     8.41  6.58  0.15  0.15   
Compact 3.16   3.64  13.72  1.03 0.54   
Intermediate     1.04  7.35    0.26   
Standard 33.53    11.76  1.91  3.81    
Luxury 22.29    6.20  5.94       
Germany (DE)             
Subcompact 0.28  1.50  7.48 12.25  0.58  0.65  0.64 
Compact 1.48   1.34  11.61  1.60 0.52  0.23 
Intermediate   0.08  1.60  10.27    1.12  1.36 
Standard  51.94   4.52  4.13  3.25     
Luxury 22.77    1.52  2.14       
Italy (IT)             
Subcompact 0.06  0.09  42.73  7.96 0.31  2.15  0.24 
Compact 5.03   18.46  17.08  1.45 1.09   
Intermediate     22.24  10.70    1.18  0.75 
Standard 28.78    48.74  4.58 1.77     
Luxury 16.90    31.91  3.09      
UK             
Subcompact 0.32  0.69  6.38  22.48   0.85  0.32 
Compact 12.83    2.94  21.64  5.05 2.08   
Intermediate     1.31  24.58   1.24   
Standard  44.16   5.60  8.55  15.19    
Luxury 24.12    1.44  5.70       
Total market             
Subcompact 0.14  0.50  18.46  11.32  0.28  1.03  0.31 
Compact 4.92   4.89  15.05  2.29 1.00  0.09 
Intermediate 0.00  0.03  3.80  13.06    0.94  0.62 
Standard  44.06   12.90  5.05  5.63     
Luxury 22.11    6.61  3.40       











UKstan ITsubc  DEinte 
Source: European car market database, own calculations  
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Table B7: European car market: geographic-product market presence (defined by shares of a 
firm in a market segment (‘market-share dominance’)), 1999 (continuation) 
  Mazda Mercedes  Mitsubishi Nissan GM  Peugeot  Renault 
Belgium (BE)             
Subcompact 1.61      2.62  11.52  21.61  14.67 
Compact 2.54  3.69  0.92 2.81  17.03  10.51  13.44 
Intermediate 2.09    5.57  3.28 6.08  28.00  5.37 
Standard         8.63  2.24 3.98 
Luxury   50.85   0.58  4.80    
France (FR)             
Subcompact 0.16      1.09  6.69  31.92 31.75 
Compact 0.58  3.06  0.14 0.91  8.71  20.23  20.98 
Intermediate 0.61    0.26  1.81  4.77  53.35  17.05 
Standard         6.60  7.50 25.60 
Luxury   61.52     2.56    
Germany (DE)             
Subcompact 1.44      2.74  14.79  8.50  13.33 
Compact 2.91  9.14  0.91 1.51  20.96  2.09 4.05 
Intermediate  4.62   3.22  3.27  14.57  6.40  4.39 
Standard         11.29  0.46 0.13 
Luxury   69.63   0.37  1.25    
Italy (IT)             
Subcompact 0.21      2.68  7.40  9.78  9.46 
Compact 0.33  4.93  0.29 0.82  17.23  3.50   
Intermediate 0.39    0.42  3.74  8.34 15.35 3.19 
Standard         3.75  0.32  
Luxury   45.38     1.72    
UK             
Subcompact 0.40      7.54  13.69 20.12  10.10 
Compact 1.39  2.25  0.34 2.93  14.72  8.55  6.79 
Intermediate 1.50    1.89  5.34 19.04 16.88 7.49 
Standard         19.04   0.28 
Luxury   55.51   0.95  10.98    
Total market             
Subcompact 0.55      3.20  10.18  17.28  16.11 
Compact 1.77  5.66  0.56 1.70  16.82  7.06  7.15 
Intermediate 2.32    2.01  3.45  12.07  22.23  8.04 
Standard         11.07  1.21 3.16 
Luxury   62.79   0.37  2.83    
‘Spheres   
of influence’ 









Source: European car market database, own calculations  
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Table B7: European car market: geographic-product market presence (defined by shares of a 
firm in a market segment (‘market-share dominance’)), 1999 (continuation) 
  FujiHI  Suzuki  Toyota     VW  Daewoo  Daimler 
Belgium (BE)           
Subcompact  0.14  0.99  4.24 22.44  1.49  
Compact     5.34  24.30 1.21   
Intermediate   1.41 6.04  24.02 1.22   
Standard    0.42 18.04  0.56  
Luxury      1.36    
France (FR)           
Subcompact   0.17  1.54 10.31  0.59 0.48 
Compact    1.31 20.96  1.03  
Intermediate   0.43  1.46 11.07  0.53  
Standard       8.70  0.61   
Luxury      1.49    
Germany (DE)           
Subcompact   0.77  2.29  27.17  0.58  4.99 
Compact     2.31  38.98  0.37  
Intermediate   0.86  3.21  44.61  0.43  
Standard     0.19  24.10     
Luxury      2.32    
Italy (IT)           
Subcompact   0.13  2.26 9.54  3.72 1.30 
Compact    2.82 23.96  3.02  
Intermediate   0,80  2.83  26.60 3.47   
Standard       10.45  1.61   
Luxury      0.99    
UK           
Subcompact   0.88  2.70 11.50  2.04  
Compact    3.31 13.37  1.80  
Intermediate     5.40  14.21 1.13   
Standard     0.41  6.77     
Luxury      1.31    
Total           
Subcompact   0.45  2.24 14.46  1.86 1.63 
Compact   0.00  2.63 27.13  1.27  
Intermediate   0.58  3.40 26.45  1.01  
Standard    0.19 16.38  0.35  
Luxury      1.89    
‘Spheres   
of influence’ 




Source: European car market database, own calculations 
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Table B8: European car market: geographic-product market presence (share of a market 
segment in the total sales of a firm (‘market dependence’)), 1999 
  BMW Daihatsu  Fiat  Ford  Honda  Hyundai  Kia 
Belgium (BE)            
Subcompact  0.02  1.70 0.85  1.05 0.56 1.09  5.07 
Compact  0.46   0.47 1.40  2.28  2.12  0.28 
Intermediate  0.00   0.20 1.22    1.09  2.72 
Standard  2.40   0.49 0.22  1.35     
Luxury  0.99   0.15 0.22       
France (FR)            
Subcompact      7.50  5.14 1.16 1.56   
Compact  2.58   1.63 5.39  4.12  2.90   
Intermediate     0.47  2.90   1.41   
Standard  4.34   0.84 0.12  2.41     
Luxury  1.59   0.24 0.20       
Germany (DE)            
Subcompact  0.41 65.24  6.02 8.63  4.18  6.20  20.17 
Compact  3.14   1.56 11.83  16.65  7.16  10.31 
Intermediate    2.79 1.09  6.16   9.11  36.36 
Standard  28.85    1.38  1.10 8.82    
Luxury  13.50   0.50  0.61      
Italy (IT)            
Subcompact  0.12  5.35 48.23  7.86 3.17 28.79  10.43 
Compact  4.23   8.51 6.89  5.94  5.95   
Intermediate     4.85  2.04   3.07  6.37 
Standard  5.18   4.81 0.40  1.56     
Luxury  2.48   2.56 0.22       
UK            
Subcompact  0.40 24.92  4.29 13.22    6.82  8.30 
Compact  15.52    1.95  12.56 29.84 16.38   
Intermediate     0.57  9.28   6.34   
Standard 10.69    0.74  0.99  17.97     
Luxury  3.08   0.10 0.35       
Total firm  
sales 
100  100 100  100 100 100  100 
‘Spheres of 
influence’ 
DEstan DEsubc  ITsubc DEcomp, 
UKsubc, 
UKcomp 
UKcomp ITsubc  DEinte 
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
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Table B8: European car market: geographic-product market presence (share of a market 
segment in the total sales of a firm (‘market dependence’)), 1999 (continuation) 
  Mazda Mercedes  Mitsu 
bishi 
Nissan GM  Peugeot  Renault 
Belgium (BE)          
Subcompact  1.77     1.43 1.25 2.18 1.93 
Compact  3.36 1.12 2.59  1.84 2.21 1.27 2.12 
Intermediate  1.89   10.64  1.46 0.54 2.31 0.58 
Standard       0.25  0.06  0.14 
Luxury    2.25   0.06 0.09    
France (FR)          
Subcompact  1.23     4.18 5.11 22.64  29.42 
Compact  2.27 2.74 1.13  1.76 3.34 7.22 9.78 
Intermediate  2.38   2.12  3.52 1.84 19.15  8.00 
Standard       0.40  0.42  1.89 
Luxury   4.80     0.09    
Germany (DE)          
Subcompact  10.08     9.50  10.18 5.44  11.14 
Compact  29.46 21.28 19.46  7.55  20.88 1.93  4.90 
Intermediate  27.52    40.72  9.63 8.53 3.48 3.12 
Standard       2.94  0.11  0.04 
Luxury    45.24    0.52 0.35    
Italy (IT)          
Subcompact  2.02     13.03  7.14 8.78 11.09 
Compact  1.33 4.54 2.43  1.64 6.79 1.28  
Intermediate  0.75   1.69  3.51 1.56 2.66 0.72 
Standard       0.32  0.03   
Luxury   7.29     0.12    
UK          
Subcompact  2.31     21.80  7.87 10.75  7.05 
Compact  8.02 2.98 4.20  8.37 8.35 4.51 4.68 
Intermediate  5.61   15.04  9.91 7.03 5.79 3.36 
Standard       2.16   0.04 
Luxury    7.76   0.29 0.66    
Total firm  
sales 





DElux DEinte  UKsubc  DEcomp  FRsubc, 
FRinte 
FRsubc 
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
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Table B8: European car market: geographic-product market presence (share of a market 
segment in the total sales of a firm (‘market dependence’)), 1999 (continuation) 





         
Subcompact  100.00  4.58 2.42 1.48 1.51    1.33 
Compact      3.65 1.92 1.47    1.59 
Intermediate    5.33 2.81 1.29 1.01    1.08 
Standard      0.06 0.31 0.15    0.35 
Luxury      0.02     0.23 
France (FR)           
Subcompact    5.68 6.18 4.78 4.22  7.29 9.31 
Compact      2.65 4.89 3.70    4.68 
Intermediate    7.05 2.97 2.60 1.92    4.71 
Standard      0.32  0.35   0.74 
Luxury      0.03     0.41 
Germany 
(DE) 
         
Subcompact    22.66 8.27  11.37 3.71  67.95 8.40 
Compact      12.10 23.61 3.45    12.16 
Intermediate    21.44 9.86  15.89 2.36    7.15 
Standard      0.25 3.82     3.18 
Luxury      0.39     3.39 
Italy (IT)           
Subcompact    5.38 11.44  5.60 33.47 24.76  11.78 
Compact      5.84 5.74 11.09   4.81 
Intermediate    6.35 2.77 3.02 6.03    2.28 
Standard      0.54  1.27   1.03 
Luxury      0.04     0.84 
UK           
Subcompact    21.52  8.15 4.02 10.93   7.01 
Compact      9.86 4.61 9.50    6.92 
Intermediate     10.47  3.19  3.88    4.50 
Standard      0.24 0.47     1.39 
Luxury      0.05     0.73 
Total firm  
sales 










DEcomp ITsubc  DEsubc   
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
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Alfa Romeo  Alfa Romeo (till 1986 (including 1986)) 
BMW  BMW, Rover Triumph (1994-1999) 
Daihatsu   Daihatsu (starting 1979) 
Fiat  1970: Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Autobianchi; 1971: Citroen, Fiat, 
Lancia; 1972-1974: Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Autobianchi; 1975: 
Citroen, Fiat, Lancia; 1976-1986: Fiat, Lancia; 1987-1989: 
AlfaRomeo, Fiat, Lancia; 1990-1996: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, Lancia, 
Innocenti; 1997-1999: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, Lancia 
Ford  Ford, Volvo (1999) 
Honda Honda 
Hyundai   Hyundai (starting 1980) 
DeTomaso Innocenti  (1970-1989) 
Kia  Kia (starting 1993) 
Mazda   Mazda (starting 1972) 
Mercedes Mercedes 
Mitsubishi   Mitsubishi (starting 1976) 
Nissan NissanDatsun 
GM  OpelVauxhall, Saab (starting 1990) 
Peugeot  Peugeot, Citroen (starting 1976), Talbot (1980-1986) 
Renault Renault 
Rover RoverTriumph  (1970-1993),  Rover (1970-1979), Triumph (1970-
1979), Princess (1976-1979) 
Saab Saab  (1970-1989) 
Seat   Seat (1983-1985) 
Fujuhi   Subaru (starting 1979) 
Suzuki   Suzuki (starting 1981) 
Toyota     Toyota 
VW  Audi, Volkswagen, Seat (starting 1986), Skoda (starting 1993) 
Volvo Volvo  (1970-1998) 
Yugo   Yugo (1981-1991) 
Daewoo   Daewoo (starting 1995) 
Daimler   MMC (1998-1999) 
DAF DAF  (1970-1975) 
TalbotSimca 
HillmanSunbeam 
TalbotHillmanChrysler (1970-1979), TalbotSimca (1970-1977), 
TalbotSimca (1978-1979), TalbotMatra (1978-1979) 
TalbotMatra TalbotMatra (1970-1977) 
Lancia   Lancia (1971) 
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Table B10: European car market: cross-ownership changes 
Firm (equivalent to corporate 
group) 
Brands 
Ford Group  Mazda (33%) 
GM Group  Subaru (20%), Suzuki (20%), Isuzu (12%), Fiat (10%) 
RenaultNissan Group  Nissan (44%) 
Toyota Daihatsu  (52%) 
DaimlerChrysler   Mitsubishi (24.7%) 
Hyundai Kia  (60%) 
Source: Deustche Bank (2004) 
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Appendix C. European car market: descriptive statistics for 
concentration ratios and multimarket contact measures 
Table C1: European car market: descriptive statistics for multimarket contact measures 
(averages across years and firms))  
Firm  Number of markets in which a firm 
is present 
Number of multiple contacts 
  mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev. 
Alfa Romeo  12.74  0.12  126.86  1.88 
BMW 15.54  0.20  131.40  2.52 
Daihatsu  4.20 0.12 53.42  1.56 
Fiat 21.99  0.08 202.15  1.14 
Ford 19.00  0.11 200.28  1.71 
Honda 12.72  0.24  138.51 2.37 
Hyundai  9.46 0.29 123.52  4.15 
De  Tomaso  2.26 0.14 19.21  1.34 
Kia  8.96 0.35 122.22  5.14 
Mazda 12.79  0.12  152.25 1.84 
Mercedes  5.46 0.09 28.07  1.52 
Mitsubishi  9.53 0.11 117.5  1.33 
Nissan 15.64  0.12  174.04 1.62 
GM 21.91  0.12 210.28  1.78 
Peugeot 19.73  0.02  208.83  0.64 
Renault 17.32  0.12  183.46  1.72 
Rover 14.84 0.12  155.93  1.80 
Saab 5.72 0.29 54.38  2.26 
Seat 5.18 0.27 53.29  3.21 
Fujihi  1.59 0.09 20.34  1.16 
Suzuki  6.58 0.29 80.18  4.00 
Toyota 14.42  0.12  166.44 1.71 
VW 20.90  0.07 213.94  1.10 
Volvo 13.14  0.23  125.64  2.37 
Yugo  2.71 0.10 28.86  1.13 
Daewoo 14.36  0.56  185.44  7.30 
Daimler 2.5  0.50  37.50  7.50 
DAF  4.79 0.12 36.86  1.08 
Talbotsimca 14.03  0.16  121.94  2.10 
Talbotmatra  3.17 0.16 27.91  1.69 
Lancia  8.00 0.00 71.00  0.00 
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Table C2: European car market: descriptive statistics for multimarket contact measures and 
number of competitors (averages across years and geographic-product markets))  
Firm Simple  count  Share-weighted    No. of competitors 
  mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev.  mean  std. dev. 
Belgium: compact   10.69  0.08  740.19  8.14  14.47  0.08 
Belgium: intermediate  11.88  0.05  810.88  10.48  12.86  0.09 
Belgium: luxury  9.93  0.21  1866.22  92.68  5.85  0.11 
Belgium: standard  11.41  0.13  938.40  16.70  12.59  0.10 
Belgium:  subcompact  9.99  0.08 770.99  5.69 12.33  0.07 
France:  compact    12.36  0.07 889.63  6.96 12.95  0.06 
France: intermediate  13.20  0.06  992.52  12.46  11.53  0.10 
France: luxury  10.08  0.28  2738.35  179.06  5.14  0.13 
France: standard  12.14  0.15  1142.59  22.60  11.01  0.10 
France: subcompact  11.96  0.12  1043.22  10.36  10.39  0.05 
Germany: compact   11.99  0.08  849.39  6.28  12.93  0.07 
Germany: intermediate  12.76  0.09  943.21  14.07  11.65  0.11 
Germany: luxury  10.08  0.22  1976.58  74.06  5.65  0.12 
Germany: standard  12.16  0.12  1079.97  15.53  10.72  0.08 
Germany: subcompact  11.60  0.09  965.55  11.02  10.90  0.09 
Italy: compact   13.53  0.09  1282.32  16.58  10.48  0.11 
Italy: intermediate  14.07  0.09  1412.00  27.84  9.68  0.14 
Italy: luxury  9.34  0.28  2138.78  76.93  5.05  0.10 
Italy: standard  12.66  0.16  1420.79  20.08  8.86  0.07 
Italy: subcompact  11.81  0.10  1227.70  14.60  9.49  0.09 
UK: compact   11.49  0.09  794.58  4.77  13.32  0.08 
UK: intermediate  12.32  0.05  863.61  11.10  12.49  0.11 
UK: luxury  9.69  0.23  2136.97  146.41  5.71  0.14 
UK: standard  11.67  0.15  1020.77  19.30  11.56  0.11 
UK:  subcompact  11.36  0.09 933.01  8.00 11.21  0.08 
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Table C3: European car market: descriptive statistics for concentration ratios (across 
geographic-product markets) 
  No.  obs.  C1   C4   C8  
    mean std.  dev. mean std.  dev. mean std.  dev.
Belgium: compact   618  23.13 0.18  60.96 0.24  87.19  0.17 
Belgium: intermediate  588  24.80 0.19  67.25 0.32  90.70  0.17 
Belgium: luxury  211  61.80 0.66  96.63 0.18  100  0 
Belgium: standard  514  26.89 0.33  70.66 0.31  91.89  0.35 
Belgium: subcompact  742  24.44 0.12  66.73 0.18  93.18  0.11 
France: compact   541  33.44 0.27  80.36 0.19  95.47  0.08 
France: intermediate  488  48.47 0.34  88.43 0.18  97.83  0.09 
France: luxury  165  63.13 0.81  97.41 0.15  100  0 
France: standard  426  46.05 0.48  87.44 0.18  97.69  0.08 
France: subcompact  645  40.85 0.24  87.76 0.21  99.43  0.02 
Germany: compact   518  40.71 0.19  80.16 0.16  93.16  0.17 
Germany: intermediate 509  43.61 0.25  83.88 0.30  95.87  0.15 
Germany: luxury  199  73.58 0.66  98.48 0.10  100  0 
Germany:  standard 422 38.14 0.43 86.76 0.22 98.05  0.07 
Germany: subcompact  635  28.41 0.38  76.74 0.38  97.26  0.09 
Italy: compact   447  38.18 0.56  81.85 0.36  97.88  0.14 
Italy: intermediate  418  42.57 0.86  83.03 0.46  97.29  0.19 
Italy: luxury  175  49.94 0.84  97.91 0.10  100  0 
Italy: standard  353  43.33 0.43  86.07 0.31  98.68  0.08 
Italy: subcompact  634  64.71 0.41  89.98 0.25  99.44  0.06 
UK: compact   557  32.49 0.30  74.76 0.38  92.28  0.15 
UK: intermediate  531  34.81 0.51  78.98 0.32  95.34  0.12 
UK: luxury  176  45.75 1.08  96.74 0.22  100  0 
UK: standard  439  31.36 0.58  74.56 0.52  93.82  0.23 
UK: subcompact  598  31.73 0.53  72.68 0.31  97.50  0.07 
Source: own calculations 
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Appendix D. European car market: descriptive statistics (dataset) 
Table D1: European car market: descriptive statistics for the European car market 
 mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
Total European (No. observations: 11549) 
price/income  0.83 0.41 0.24 6.47 
sales  19813.24 37719.92 51  433694 
horsepower  57.14 23.88 13  169.5 
weight 978.87 225.41 520  1910 
width 164.38  9.62  122  188 
height 140.43  4.62  117.5  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.18 1.72 4  18.6 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.19 0.39 0  1 
Belgium (No. observations: 2673) 
price/income  0.72 0.34 0.25 3.45 
sales  3925.42 4453.51 51  62410 
horsepower  56.53 23.71 13  165 
weight 976.00 227.46 520  1750 
width 164.16  9.82  122  188 
height 140.34  4.63  117.5  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.22 1.76 4.5  18.6 
domestic car 
dummy 
0 0 0 0 
France (No. observations: 2265) 
price/income  0.75 0.32 0.27 3.59 
sales  23305.81 38090.45 279  300395 
horsepower  56.17 23.02 13  169 
weight 973.02 220.39 520  1750 
width 164.28  9.46  122  188 
height 140.46  4.85  117.5  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.12 1.66 4.5  15.5 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.25 0.43 0  1 
Italy (No. observations: 2027) 
price/income  0.99 0.49 0.28 5.35 
sales 24292.14  45754.1  291  433694 
horsepower  57.22 24.86 13  169.5 
weight 978.69 229.32 520  1910 
width 164.06  9.99  122  188 
height 140.63  4.68  117.5  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.08 1.69 4.6  18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.24 0.42 0  1 
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Table D1: European car market: descriptive statistics for the European car market 
(continuation) 
 mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
Germany (No. observations: 2283) 
price/income  0.65 0.27 0.24 2.45 
sales  31002.55 50282.04 350  414132 
horsepower  57.45 24.27 13  169 
weight 983.05 228.66 520  1750 
width 164.57  9.74  122  188 
height 140.49  4.66  117.5  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.24 1.77 4  18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.27 0.44 0  1 
UK (No. observations: 2301) 
price/income  1.05 0.45 0.32 6.47 
sales  19784.34 29875.92 296  193784 
horsepower  58.42 23.61 13  165 
weight 984.00 221.13 520  1825 
width 164.82  9.06  129.5 188 
height 140.27  4.29  122  173.5 
fuel  efficiency  8.22 1.68 4.5  18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.23 0.42 0  1 
Source: European car market database, own estimations 
 